Dismissal of Slip and Fall Case at Summary Judgment Stage Was Premature Where Relevant Evidence Is Entirely Within the Control of the Defendants
The Third Department determined summary judgment granted to the village and county in a slip and fall case should have been denied. Plaintiff tripped on patched pavement on an approach to a bridge. There was a question of fact whether the county or the village was responsible for repairs in that area. Because the information regarding the repairs was totally beyond the control of the plaintiff, dismissal at the summary judgment stage was premature:
…[P]laintiffs have not produced any direct evidence that either the County or the Village performed the patching that plaintiffs’ expert says caused plaintiff’s injury. Notably, however, neither defendant produced written policies, repair logs, inspection reports or other documentation – other than the survey – to support their respective claims; both deny that any pertinent records exist and rely exclusively upon the testimony of their officials. The pertinent facts are entirely outside plaintiffs’ knowledge and within the exclusive knowledge of the parties moving for summary judgment – a circumstance in which summary judgment is inappropriate … . In the absence of direct evidence, plaintiffs are forced to rely solely on circumstantial evidence to oppose defendants’ summary judgment motion – that is, the inference that, given the claim of each defendant that the other bears responsibility for maintaining the bridge approach, and the dearth of evidence that any other entity has such responsibility or authority, one of them must have performed the repairs that allegedly caused plaintiff’s accident … . In these circumstances, “[a]lthough plaintiffs clearly will bear the burden of proof on the issue at trial, they raised sufficient issues of fact in the context of [these] summary judgment motion[s] to warrant having the circumstantial evidence and defendants’ credibility concerning the [creation of the defect] tested by cross-examination and assessed by the trier of fact”… . Guimond v Village of Keeseville, 515869, 516320, 3rd Dept 1-9-13