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NYC LANDMARKS PRESERVATION COMMISSION’S DECISION THAT IT DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO REGULATE THE MECHANISM OF AND ACCESS TO A LANDMARK NINETEENTH CENTURY CLOCKTOWER WHICH HAD BEEN PURCHASED BY A PRIVATE PARTY WAS BASED UPON AN ERROR OF LAW AND WAS IRRATIONAL (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Gesmer, over a two-justice dissent, determined the NYC Landmarks Preservation Commission’s (LPC’s) decision to allow the electrification of a landmark nineteenth century clocktower (similar in structure to Big Ben) was based upon an error of law and was irrational. The clocktower had been sold to a private party which planned to convert it to a residence. The LPC found, in effect, that the commission did not have authority over the now privately-owned clocktower:

 

We hold that the LPC has authority under the Landmarks Law to regulate the clock mechanism for two reasons.

First, this result effectuates the statutory purposes. The Landmarks Law, New York City’s first historic preservation statute, * * * declares that “the protection, enhancement, perpetuation and use of improvements . . . of special character or special historical or aesthetic interest or value is a public necessity and is required in the interest of the health, prosperity, safety and welfare of the people” (Landmarks Law § 25-301[b]). … * * *

Second, the Landmarks Law defines the term “interior architectural feature” to include the “components of an interior, including, but not limited to . . . the type and style of all . . . fixtures appurtenant to such interior” (Landmarks Law § 25-302[l]). Matter of Save America’s Clocks, Inc. v City of New York, 2017 NY Slip Op 08457, First Dept 11-30-17

 

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (NYC LANDMARKS PRESERVATION LAW NYC LANDMARKS PRESERVATION COMMISSION’S DECISION THAT IT DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO REGULATE THE MECHANISM OF AND ACCESS TO A LANDMARK NINETEENTH CENTURY CLOCKTOWER WHICH HAD BEEN PURCHASED BY A PRIVATE PARTY WAS BASED UPON AN ERROR OF LAW AND WAS IRRATIONAL (FIRST DEPT))/MUNICIPAL LAW  (NYC LANDMARKS PRESERVATION LAW NYC LANDMARKS PRESERVATION COMMISSION’S DECISION THAT IT DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO REGULATE THE MECHANISM OF AND ACCESS TO A LANDMARK NINETEENTH CENTURY CLOCKTOWER WHICH HAD BEEN PURCHASED BY A PRIVATE PARTY WAS BASED UPON AN ERROR OF LAW AND WAS IRRATIONAL (FIRST DEPT))/ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (NYC LANDMARKS PRESERVATION LAW NYC LANDMARKS PRESERVATION COMMISSION’S DECISION THAT IT DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO REGULATE THE MECHANISM OF AND ACCESS TO A LANDMARK NINETEENTH CENTURY CLOCKTOWER WHICH HAD BEEN PURCHASED BY A PRIVATE PARTY WAS BASED UPON AN ERROR OF LAW AND WAS IRRATIONAL (FIRST DEPT))/LANDMARKS (NYC LANDMARKS PRESERVATION LAW NYC LANDMARKS PRESERVATION COMMISSION’S DECISION THAT IT DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO REGULATE THE MECHANISM OF AND ACCESS TO A LANDMARK NINETEENTH CENTURY CLOCKTOWER WHICH HAD BEEN PURCHASED BY A PRIVATE PARTY WAS BASED UPON AN ERROR OF LAW AND WAS IRRATIONAL (FIRST DEPT))/CLOCKTOWER  (NYC LANDMARKS PRESERVATION LAW NYC LANDMARKS PRESERVATION COMMISSION’S DECISION THAT IT DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO REGULATE THE MECHANISM OF AND ACCESS TO A LANDMARK NINETEENTH CENTURY CLOCKTOWER WHICH HAD BEEN PURCHASED BY A PRIVATE PARTY WAS BASED UPON AN ERROR OF LAW AND WAS IRRATIONAL (FIRST DEPT))

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