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ALTHOUGH THE PLANNING BOARD HELD THAT IT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE PROPOSED DEVELOPMENT, A FINDING WITH WHICH PETITIONERS DISAGREED, THE BOARD ALSO HELD THE PETITIONERS COULD APPLY FOR A HARDSHIP EXEMPTION WHICH WAS NOT DONE, THE ACTION IS THEREFORE PREMATURE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the action seeking a declaration whether a proposed development was within the jurisdiction of the planning board was premature. Although the board found it had jurisdiction, it also indicated the landowner could obtain a hardship exemption which would allow development:

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Here, the Planning Commission’s initial finding that the proposed subdivision constituted “development” within the meaning of the Act (see Environmental Conservation Law § 57-0107[13]; see also Central Pine Barrens Comprehensive Land Use Plan § 4.3.5) did not constitute a final determination prohibiting the petitioners from subdividing the property in accordance with their proposal. As the Planning Commission’s determination indicated, the petitioners may still obtain a hardship exemption, which would render the proposed residential use of the property authorized … . Since the petitioners failed to adequately allege that they suffered an actual concrete injury, the Supreme Court properly granted the respondents’ motion to dismiss the proceeding as premature … . Matter of Equine Facility, LLC v Pavacic, 2017 NY Slip Op 08371, Second Dept 11-29-17

 

ZONING (ALTHOUGH THE PLANNING BOARD HELD THAT IT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE PROPOSED DEVELOPMENT, A FINDING WITH WHICH PETITIONERS DISAGREED, THE BOARD ALSO HELD THE PETITIONERS COULD APPLY FOR A HARDSHIP EXEMPTION WHICH WAS NOT DONE, THE ACTION IS THEREFORE PREMATURE (SECOND DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (RIPENESS, ZONING, ALTHOUGH THE PLANNING BOARD HELD THAT IT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE PROPOSED DEVELOPMENT, A FINDING WITH WHICH PETITIONERS DISAGREED, THE BOARD ALSO HELD THE PETITIONERS COULD APPLY FOR A HARDSHIP EXEMPTION WHICH WAS NOT DONE, THE ACTION IS THEREFORE PREMATURE (SECOND DEPT))/ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (ZONING,  (ALTHOUGH THE PLANNING BOARD HELD THAT IT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE PROPOSED DEVELOPMENT, A FINDING WITH WHICH PETITIONERS DISAGREED, THE BOARD ALSO HELD THE PETITIONERS COULD APPLY FOR A HARDSHIP EXEMPTION WHICH WAS NOT DONE, THE ACTION IS THEREFORE PREMATURE (SECOND DEPT))

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​ IN THIS LEGAL MALPRACTICE ACTION, THE EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY DEFENDANT ATTORNEYS IN SUPPORT OF THE MOTION TO DISMISS WAS NOT “DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE;” THE PROOF REQUIREMENTS FOR A MOTION TO DISMISS ARE DIFFERENT FROM THE PROOF REQUIREMENTS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; THE MOTION TO DISMSS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
Action Properly Brought by Third Party Beneficiary of Indemnity Agreement
LAW FIRM SANCTIONED FOR FAILURE TO APPEAR AT A MANDATORY MEDIATION SESSION TO ATTEMPT TO RESOLVE THE MATTER ON APPEAL (SECOND DEPT).
THE MEANING OF ‘SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE’ SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A DETERMINATION IN AN ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT).
PLAINTIFF HUSBAND IN THIS DIVORCE ACTION INSTALLED SPYWARE WHICH INTERCEPTED DEFENDANT WIFE’S PHONE CALLS AND THEN DESTROYED THE CONTENTS OF THE INTERCEPTION; THE INTERCEPTION VIOLATED DEFENDANT WIFE’S ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE; SANCTIONS FOR SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE PROPERLY INCLUDED STRIKING THE CAUSES OF ACTION FOR SPOUSAL SUPPORT, EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION AND ATTORNEY’S FEES (SECOND DEPT).
AFTER THE JURY HAD FOUND DEFENDANT DID NOT VIOLATE LABOR LAW 240 (1), THE APPELLATE COURT DETERMINED PLAINTIFF SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION AT THE OUTSET, PLAINTIFF FELL FROM A LADDER WHEN THE LADDER SHIFTED.
DEFENDANT DEMONSTRATED (1) HE WAS MISADVISED THAT HIS GUILTY PLEA WOULD NOT RESULT IN DEPORTATION AND (2), HAD HE BEEN PROPERLY ADVISED, A DECISION TO GO TO TRIAL WOULD HAVE BEEN RATIONAL; DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO VACATE HIS CONVICTION WAS PROPERLY GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
LOCAL LAW REQUIRING A PERMIT FOR THE TRANSPORT OF WASTE WITHIN THE COUNTY WAS NOT PREEMPTED BY STATE LAW (WHICH ALSO REQUIRED A PERMIT) AND DID NOT VIOLATE THE COMMERCE CLAUSE, PETITIONER PROPERLY FINED FOR FAILURE TO OBTAIN A COUNTY PERMIT (SECOND DEPT).

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