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BANK MOVED FOR AN ORDER OF REFERENCE WITHIN ONE YEAR OF DEFAULT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION, THE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED AS ABANDONED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined Supreme Court should not have dismissed this foreclosure action as abandoned because the bank moved for an order of reference within one year of the default:

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CPLR 3215(c) provides that “[i]f the plaintiff fails to take proceedings for the entry of judgment within one year after [a] default, the court shall not enter judgment but shall dismiss the complaint as abandoned, without costs, upon its own initiative or on motion, unless sufficient cause is shown why the complaint should not be dismissed.” However, “[i]t is not necessary for a plaintiff to actually obtain a default judgment within one year of the default in order to avoid dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3215(c)” … . Rather, it is enough that the plaintiff timely takes “the preliminary step toward obtaining a default judgment of foreclosure and sale by moving for an order of reference” to establish that it “initiated proceedings for entry of a judgment within one year of the default” for the purpose of satisfying CPLR 3215(c) … . “[A]s long as proceedings are being taken, and these proceedings manifest an intent not to abandon the case but to seek a judgment, the case should not be subject to dismissal” … . This is so even where, as here, a timely motion for an order of reference is subsequently withdrawn … .

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Here, the plaintiff took the preliminary step toward obtaining a default judgment of foreclosure and sale by moving for an order of reference (see RPAPL 1321[1]) … within one year of the defendant’s default. Accordingly, the plaintiff did not abandon the action … . Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Mayen, 2017 NY Slip Op 07768, Second Dept 11-8-17

 

CIVIL PROCEDURE (ABANDONMENT, BANK MOVED FOR AN ORDER OF REFERENCE WITHIN ONE YEAR OF DEFAULT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION, THE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED AS ABANDONED (SECOND DEPT))/ABANDONMENT (CIVIL PROCEDURE, BANK MOVED FOR AN ORDER OF REFERENCE WITHIN ONE YEAR OF DEFAULT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION, THE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED AS ABANDONED (SECOND DEPT))/FORECLOSURE (CIVIL PROCEDURE, (ABANDONMENT, BANK MOVED FOR AN ORDER OF REFERENCE WITHIN ONE YEAR OF DEFAULT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION, THE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED AS ABANDONED (SECOND DEPT))/CPLR 3215 (c)  (ABANDONMENT, BANK MOVED FOR AN ORDER OF REFERENCE WITHIN ONE YEAR OF DEFAULT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION, THE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED AS ABANDONED (SECOND DEPT))/DEFAULT JUDGMENT (ABANDONMENT, BANK MOVED FOR AN ORDER OF REFERENCE WITHIN ONE YEAR OF DEFAULT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION, THE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED AS ABANDONED (SECOND DEPT))

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SUMMARY JUDGMENT ENTERING A RENEWAL JUDGMENT PROPERLY GRANTED, CRITERIA EXPLAINED... ALLEGATION THAT LAW FIRM ADDUCED FALSE EVIDENCE IN A PROCEEDING MUST BE ASSERTED...