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Amendment of Decision and Order Dismissing Indictment Was Proper

The Second Department, over an extensive dissent, determined Supreme Court properly amended a decision and order which initially granted defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment on “speedy trial” grounds. The amended decision and order, which was issued a day after the initial decision and order, denied the motion with respect to three counts:

A court possesses “inherent authority to rectify a prior error in dismissing an indictment” … , and “where there is a clearly erroneous dismissal of an indictment or count thereof, it is unreasonable to foreclose a court from reconsidering its previous determination” …, even in the absence of a formal motion for leave to reargue by the People … . Furthermore, under the facts of this case, there was no constitutional or statutory impediment to the court’s power to promptly modify its prior determination to dismiss the indictment and to thereby correct the previous error … .

Here, the Supreme Court recognized the error only one day after issuing the initial decision and order, well within the time period during which, for example, a motion for leave to reargue could have been made and before the People even had a reasonable opportunity to make such a motion. Moreover, while any present challenge to the court’s determination of the statutory speedy trial issue in the amended decision and order was forfeited by the defendant’s knowing, voluntary, and intelligent plea of guilty …, we note, in any event, that the error in initially dismissing counts seven, eight, and nine based on an alleged statutory speedy trial violation was clearly apparent from the documents in the court file. Accordingly, the prompt issuance of the amended decision and order correcting the prior mistake in this case was not improper or jurisdictionally defective. People v Francis, 2015 NY Slip Op 07679, 2nd Dept 10-21-15

 

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