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DEFENDANTS DID NOT CONTROL THE MANNER OF PLAINTIFF’S WORK AND PLAINTIFF WAS ENGAGED IN ROUTINE MAINTENANCE, NOT CONSTRUCTION. LABOR LAW 200 AND 240(1) CAUSES OF ACTION PROPERLY DISMISSED.

The Second Department determined the Labor Law 200 and 240(1) causes of action were properly dismissed. Plaintiff fell from a ladder attached to the side of a tanker truck and alleged the fall was caused by the design of the ladder and the absence of safety device. Because the Labor Law 200 cause of action was based upon the manner in which the work was performed, the fact that defendants did not control the manner of plaintiff’s work entitled defendants to summary judgment. The Labor Law 240(1) cause of action was properly dismissed because plaintiff was engaged in routine maintenance, not construction, demolition, etc.:

“When the methods or materials of the work are at issue, recovery against the owner or general contractor cannot be had . . . unless it is shown that the party to be charged had the authority to supervise or control the performance of the work'” … . A defendant has the authority to supervise or control the work for purposes of Labor Law § 200 when that defendant bears the responsibility for the manner in which the work is performed … . …

The … defendants … established, prima facie, that they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the Labor Law § 240(1) causes of action asserted against each of them by showing that the plaintiff’s work did not constitute erection, demolition, repairing, altering, painting, cleaning, or pointing of a building or structure within the meaning of Labor Law § 240(1) … . Kearney v Dynegy, Inc., 2017 NY Slip Op 05209, 2nd Dept 6-28-17

 

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