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IN A CITY WHICH DOES NOT PROVIDE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BENEFITS FOR ITS POLICE OFFICERS, AN OFFICER RECEIVING BENEFITS PURSUANT TO GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW 207-c IS NOT BARRED FROM SUING FOR GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW 205-e BENEFITS.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Stein, over a dissent, reversing the Appellate Division, determined a police officer who receives benefits under General Municipal Law 207-c is not barred from suing for benefits under General Municipal Law 205-e in a city which does not provide workers’ compensation benefits. The officer her alleged asbestos-related injury caused by the building which housed the police station:

“In addition to any other right of action or recovery under any other provision of law,” section 205-e permits police officers to bring tort claims for injuries sustained “while in the discharge or performance at any time or place of any duty imposed by . . . superior officers” where such injuries occur “directly or indirectly as a result of any neglect, omission, willful or culpable negligence of any person or persons in failing to comply with the requirements of any of the statutes, ordinances, rules, orders and requirements of the federal, state, county, village, town or city governments” (General Municipal Law § 205-e [1]). Separately, section 207-c “provides for the payment of the full amount of regular salary or wages,” along with payment for medical treatment and hospital care, “to a police officer or other covered municipal employee who is injured ‘in the performance of his [or her] duties’ or is taken ill ‘as a result of the performance of [such] duties'” * * *

… [W]e reject the City’s argument, also adopted by the dissent, that General Municipal Law § 207-c benefits can be equated to workers’ compensation benefits for purposes of interpreting the proviso contained in General Municipal Law § 205-e [FN2]. The language of section 205-e prohibits only recipients of workers’ compensation benefits from commencing suit against their employers; it does not, by its terms, bar the commencement of suits by recipients of section 207-c benefits — which we have repeatedly recognized to be separate and distinct from workers’ compensation benefits. In fact, section 205-e states that the right contained therein is “[i]n addition to any other right of action or recovery under any other provision of law” (General Municipal Law § 205-e [1]). Matter of Diegelman v City of Buffalo, 2016 NY Slip Op 07817, CtApp 11-21-16

 

MUNICIPAL LAW (IN A CITY WHICH DOES NOT PROVIDE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BENEFITS FOR ITS POLICE OFFICERS, AN OFFICER RECEIVING BENEFITS PURSUANT TO GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW 207-c IS NOT BARRED FROM SUING FOR GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW 205-e BENEFITS)/POLICE OFFICERS (IN A CITY WHICH DOES NOT PROVIDE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BENEFITS FOR ITS POLICE OFFICERS, AN OFFICER RECEIVING BENEFITS PURSUANT TO GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW 207-c IS NOT BARRED FROM SUING FOR GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW 205-e BENEFITS)/GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW IN A CITY WHICH DOES NOT PROVIDE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BENEFITS FOR ITS POLICE OFFICERS, AN OFFICER RECEIVING BENEFITS PURSUANT TO GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW 207-c IS NOT BARRED FROM SUING FOR GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW 205-e BENEFITS)/WORKERS COMPENSATION LAW (IN A CITY WHICH DOES NOT PROVIDE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BENEFITS FOR ITS POLICE OFFICERS, AN OFFICER RECEIVING BENEFITS PURSUANT TO GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW 207-c IS NOT BARRED FROM SUING FOR GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW 205-e BENEFITS)

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