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KNEE HIGH TABLE, UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, WAS NOT AN OPEN AND OBVIOUS DEFECT AS A MATTER OF LAW.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant did not demonstrate, as a matter of law, the low table over which plaintiff tripped and fell was an open and obvious condition:

The plaintiff Concetta Dalton (hereinafter the plaintiff) was attending a wedding reception at the defendants’ catering hall and allegedly was injured when she tripped over a knee-high table in the lobby of the catering hall and fell. The plaintiff was walking through the lobby area, where there was a crowd of people, to reach the main dining area when the accident occurred. The plaintiff testified at her deposition that she did not see the table before she fell. …

Whether a dangerous condition exists on real property so as to create liability on the part of the landowner depends on the particular facts and circumstances of each case and is generally a question of fact for the jury … . A condition that is generally apparent “to a person making reasonable use of their senses may be rendered a trap for the unwary where the condition is obscured or the plaintiff is distracted” … . The determination of “whether an asserted hazard is open and obvious cannot be divorced from the surrounding circumstances” … . Dalton v North Ritz Club, 2017 NY Slip Op 01333, 2nd Dept 2-22-17

 

NEGLIGENCE (KNEE HIGH TABLE, UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, WAS NOT AN OPEN AND OBVIOUS DEFECT AS A MATTER OF LAW)/SLIP AND FALL (KNEE HIGH TABLE, UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, WAS NOT AN OPEN AND OBVIOUS DEFECT AS A MATTER OF LAW)/OPEN AND OBVIOUS CONDITION (SLIP AND FALL, KNEE HIGH TABLE, UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, WAS NOT AN OPEN AND OBVIOUS DEFECT AS A MATTER OF LAW)

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