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DEFENDANT OFFERED MORE TO SETTLE THE ACTION THAN WAS AWARDED PLAINTIFF AFTER TRIAL; DEFENDANT WAS THEREFORE ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY’S FEES PURSUANT TO CPLR 3220 (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined defendant was entitled to attorney’s fees pursuant to CPLR 3220 in this breach of contract action. The defendant offered $950,000 to settle the action before trial and the plaintiff was awarded about $525,000:

CPLR 3220 provides, in relevant part, that, in an action to recover damages for breach of contract, at any time at least 10 days prior to trial, a defendant may make “a written offer to allow judgment to be taken against [it] for a sum therein specified, with costs then accrued, if the [defendant] fails in his defense.” If the plaintiff rejects the offer and thereafter “fails to obtain a more favorable judgment, [the plaintiff] shall pay the expenses necessarily incurred by the [defendant], for trying the issue of damages from the time of the offer” (CPLR 3220 … ). Here, since the defendant’s offer of $950,000 exceeded the plaintiff’s award of $524,253.92 and the plaintiff rejected that offer, the court should have awarded the defendant its expenses, including attorneys’ fees, incurred in trying the issue of damages from the date of its offer pursuant to CPLR 3220 … . Kirchoff-Consigli Constr. Mgt., LLC v Dharmakaya, Inc., 2020 NY Slip Op 04468, Second Dept 8-12-20

 

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