You are here: / / Sexual Assault by Son of Homeowners Not an Insured “Occurrence” Under Hom...
,

Sexual Assault by Son of Homeowners Not an Insured “Occurrence” Under Homeowners’ Insurance Policy

The Second Department determined a sexual assault allegedly perpetrated by the son of the homeowners was not an insured “occurrence” within the meaning of the homeowners’ insurance policy:

Here, Joseph M. allegedly was insured under a homeowner’s insurance policy issued by the plaintiff to his parents, which provided personal liability coverage for claims made against an insured for damages because of bodily injury caused by an “occurrence.” The policy defined the term “occurrence” as “an accident . . . which result[ed] in . . . bodily injury.”   The complaint in the underlying action alleged that the plaintiff in that action sustained bodily injury due to a sexual assault perpetrated by Joseph M. Since the bodily injuries allegedly sustained by the plaintiff in the underlying action were inherent in the conduct that Joseph M. allegedly engaged in, the alleged sexual assault cannot be construed as an accident within the definition of “occurrence” for which the plaintiff’s policy affords coverage … . State Farm Fire and Cas Co v Joseph M, 2013 NY Slip Op 03318, 2nd Dept, 5-8-13

 

You might also like
A COURT MUST ACCEPT AN ARBITRATOR’S INTERPRETATION OF CONFLICTING EVIDENCE; BUT THE TERMINATION OF THE TEACHER, WHO HAD AN UNBLEMISHED RECORD, FOR INAPPROPRIATELY RESTRAINING A FEMALE STUDENT, SHOCKED ONE’S SENSE OF FAIRNESS (SECOND DEPT).
LABOR LAW 240(1) APPLIES TO INJURIES INCURRED WHILE ENGAGED IN CONSTRUCTION WORK AS DEFINED BY THE STATUTE; THE REACH OF LABOR LAW 200 IS NOT CONFINED TO CONSTRUCTION WORK; PLAINTIFF, WHO WAS STRUCK BY LOOSE PIECES OF PLYWOOD, WAS NOT ENGAGED IN CONSTRUCTION WORK WHEN INJURED; THE MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT TO ADD A LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION WAS THEREFORE PROPERLY DENIED; BUT THE MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT TO ADD A LABOR LAW 200 CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
HERE THE FRAMING COMPANY HIRED BY THE GENERAL CONTRACTOR AND GIVEN SUPERVISORY CONTROL OVER PLAINTIFF’S WORK WAS LIABLE FOR PLAINTIFF’S INJURY AS A “STATUTORY AGENT” OF THE GENERAL CONTRACTOR WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE LABOR LAW 240 (1) (SECOND DEPT).
IF A TRIAL JUDGE DECIDES THE DAMAGES AWARDED BY THE JURY ARE EXCESSIVE, THE PROPER PROCEDURE IS TO ORDER A NEW TRIAL UNLESS PLAINTIFF STIPULATES TO THE REDUCED AWARD (SECOND DEPT).
GOODYEAR DEMONSTRATED IT DID NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT AFFILIATIONS WITH NEW YORK TO CONFER JURISDICTION IN THIS TIRE-MALFUNCTION OUT-OF-STATE ACCIDENT CASE (SECOND DEPT).
DEFENDANTS DID NOT DEMONSTRATE PLACEMENT OF A FLOWER POT NEAR THE BASKETBALL COURT DID NOT UNREASONABLY INCREASE THE INHERENT RISKS OF PLAYING BASKETBALL, SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED.
EVIDENCE OF ACCESSORIAL LIABILITY INSUFFICIENT IN THIS JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PROCEEDING, PRESENCE IS NOT ENOUGH 2ND DEPT.
FAILURE TO FOLLOW STATUTORY SENTENCING PROCEDURES FOR A PERSISTENT FELONY OFFENDER RENDERED SENTENCE “ILLEGALLY IMPOSED.”

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

Question of Fact About Property Owner’s Liability for Condition of Sidewalk... Burden Is On Parent to Demonstrate Exception to Statutory Relief from Making...