Under the Public Trust Doctrine, Only the Uses of the Dedicated Parkland Which Were Contemplated by the Relevant Provisions of the NYC Administrative Code Are Allowed—The Code Provisions Authorized Construction of Facilities Directly Related to Shea Stadium (Now Demolished)—Under Standard Rules of Statutory Construction, the Meaning of the Code Provisions Cannot Be Stretched to Allow the Construction of a Shopping Mall
The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Mazzarelli, determined that provisions of the NYC Administrative Code could not be interpreted to allow the construction of a shopping mall in the area where Shea Stadium once stood. Rather the code provisions allowed only construction which was relevant to the stadium. Under the public trust doctrine only the uses of the dedicated parkland contemplated by the code provisions were authorized
This dispute turns on whether the plain language of Administrative Code § 18-118 compels a narrow use of the parkland in question such that any additional construction on it must be directly related to a stadium, or whether any such construction on the parkland must only be related to one of the purposes delineated in § 18-118(b). The proper interpretation of the statute is critical in this case, because, under the public trust doctrine, dedicated park areas in New York are impressed with a public trust for the benefit of the people of the State, and their “use for other than park purposes, either for a period of years or permanently, requires the direct and specific approval of the State Legislature, plainly conferred” … . Stated differently, parkland may be alienated or leased for non-park purposes as long as authorized by the legislature …, and the “legislative authority required to enable a municipality to sell its public parks must be plain” … . * * *
… [T]he public trust doctrine is clear that any alienation of parkland must be explicitly authorized by the legislature. No reasonable reading of Administrative Code section 18-118 allows for the conclusion that the legislature in 1961 contemplated, much less gave permission for, a shopping mall, unrelated to the anticipated stadium, to be constructed in the Park. Further, it is simply not in our power to set the doctrine aside, no matter how worthy a proposed use of parkland may be. Here, while there is a legislative mandate for the use of the Park, that mandate does not encompass the use proposed by respondents. Matter of Avella v City of New York, 2015 NY Slip Op 05790, 1st Dept 7-2-15