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FAILURE TO TIE OFF HARNESS WAS NOT THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF PLAINTIFF’S FALL, DEFENDANTS DID NOT DEMONSTRATE PLAINTIFF KNEW OF A SAFE PLACE TO TIE OFF, PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON LABOR LAW 240(1) AND 241(6) CAUSES OF ACTION.

The First Department determined plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on both his Labor Law 240(1) and 241(6) causes of action. Defendants argued that plaintiff’s failure to tie off a harness was the sole proximate cause for the accident (a fall from an elevated platform). The First Department found that defendants did not demonstrate plaintiff had been instructed where to tie off, and did not demonstrate plaintiff knew where to tie off:

Plaintiff established prima facie that while subjected to an elevation-related risk, he was injured due to defendants’ failure to provide him with proper fall protection, namely, an appropriate place to which to attach his harness. Anderson v MSG Holdings, L.P., 2017 NY Slip Op 00002, 1st Dept 1-3-17

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTIO LAW (FAILURE TO TIE OFF HARNESS WAS NOT THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF PLAINTIFF’S FALL, DEFENDANTS DID NOT DEMONSTRATE PLAINTIFF KNEW OF A SAFE PLACE TO TIE OFF, PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON LABOR LAW 240(1) AND 241(6) CAUSES OF ACTION)/HARNESS (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, FAILURE TO TIE OFF HARNESS WAS NOT THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF PLAINTIFF’S FALL, DEFENDANTS DID NOT DEMONSTRATE PLAINTIFF KNEW OF A SAFE PLACE TO TIE OFF, PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON LABOR LAW 240(1) AND 241(6) CAUSES OF ACTION)

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FALL ON THE SURFACE OF SCAFFOLDING NOT COVERED BY LABOR LAW 240(1), OVERSIGHT... DEFENDANT NOT ENTITLED TO JURY TRIAL ON MISDEMEANORS, DESPITE POSSIBLE DEPORTATION...