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THE DEPOSIT OF FULL PAYMENT OF JUDGMENTS IN A COURT MONITORED ESCROW ACCOUNT DID NOT STOP THE ACCRUAL OF POST-JUDGMENT INTEREST (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined the deposit of full payment of judgments placed in a court monitored escrow account were subject to the accrual of post-judgment interest:

Defendants’ deposit of full payment on the judgments entered against it to a court monitored escrow account (the Monitorship Account) was not unconditional, such that it did not stop the accrual of post-judgment interest … . Although the Monitorship Order expressly directed the Monitor to collect the judgment amounts and expressly provides for the collection of “pre- and post-judgment interest,” such funds could not be further transferred until further order of the court. Moreover, the Monitorship Order reflects that the parties were not waiving “any rights, defenses or claims not set forth in the agreed order” by stipulating to the appointment of such Monitor. Accordingly, defendants’ payment to the Monitorship Account was conditioned on defendants preserving both their defenses to plaintiff’s claims, and defendants’ direct claims to those funds.

Contrary to defendants’ arguments, the payment to the Monitorship Account was not a “deposit to the court,” as it was not “pursuant to an order of the court, made upon motion” (CPLR 5021[a][3]). Rather under the circumstances, the Monitorship Account functioned simply as an escrow account while the defendants continued to oppose plaintiff’s claims and pursue their own. Triadou SPV S.A. v CF 135 Flat LLC, 2019 NY Slip Op 06453, First Dept 9-10-19

 

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