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FALL ON THE SURFACE OF SCAFFOLDING NOT COVERED BY LABOR LAW 240(1), OVERSIGHT OF SITE SAFETY NOT ENOUGH FOR LABOR LAW 200 LIABILITY, SLIP AND FALL ON DUST ENTITLED PLAINTIFF TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON LABOR LAW 241(6) CAUSE OF ACTION.

The First Department determined plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on his Labor Law 241(6) cause of action. Plaintiff slipped on accumulated dust and fell to the scaffolding surface (he did not fall off the scaffolding). The Labor Law 240(1) cause of action was properly dismissed because the fall was not related to the failure to provide a safety device. The Labor Law 200 cause of action was properly dismissed because the defendant’s general oversight of the worksite did not amount to supervisory control over the means or methods of plaintiff’s work:

The Labor Law § 240(1) claim was correctly dismissed since plaintiff’s injuries “result[ed] from a separate hazard wholly unrelated to the danger that brought about the need for the safety device[s] in the first instance” … . Plaintiff does not point to any evidence that he was injured as a result of any attempts to avoid falling off the scaffold … . The accumulation of paint chips and dust on the platform on which plaintiff was working “was one of the usual and ordinary dangers at a construction site[,] to which the extraordinary protections of Labor Law § 240(1) [do not] extend” … .

The Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence claims were correctly dismissed since the evidence that defendant’s safety officer instructed plaintiff and his coworkers on safety rules, exercised general oversight over site safety, and conducted site walk-throughs does not establish that defendant exercised supervisory control over the means or methods of plaintiff’s work … . Serrano v Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. Inc., 2017 NY Slip Op 00003, 1st Dept 1-3-17

 

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (FALL ON THE SURFACE OF SCAFFOLDING NOT COVERED BY LABOR LAW 240(1), OVERSIGHT OF SITE SAFETY NOT ENOUGH FOR LABOR LAW 200 LIABILITY, SLIP AND FALL ON DUST ENTITLED PLAINTIFF TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON LABOR LAW 241(6) CAUSE OF ACTION)/DUST (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, SLIP AND FALL ON DUST ENTITLED PLAINTIFF TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON LABOR LAW 241(6) CAUSE OF ACTION)

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