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INTERNALLY INCONSISTENT VERDICT PROPERLY SET ASIDE.

The Second Department determined Supreme Court correctly set aside a verdict in a slip and fall case as inconsistent. The jury found plaintiff was negligent but her negligence was not a substantial factor in causing her injuries (she slipped and fell on a wet floor in defendant’s store). But the jury went on to attribute 15% of the fault for the accident to plaintiff:

… [W]hen a jury’s verdict is internally inconsistent, the trial court must order either reconsideration by the jury or a new trial … . Under the circumstances here, the jury’s verdict as to liability was internally inconsistent because the jury attributed 15% of the fault for the accident to the plaintiff, despite having found that the plaintiff’s negligence was not a substantial factor in causing her injuries … . The Supreme Court properly determined that the jury was confused about the meaning of the court’s charge regarding proximate cause when it returned its liability verdict … . Magee v Cumberland Farms, Inc., 2016 NY Slip Op 08354,  2nd Dept 12-14-16

CIVIL PROCEDURE (INTERNALLY INCONSISTENT VERDICT PROPERLY SET ASIDE)/VERDICT, MOTION TO SET ASIDE (INTERNALLY INCONSISTENT VERDICT PROPERLY SET ASSIDE)/NEGLIGENCE (SLIP AND FALL, INTERNALLY INCONSISTENT VERDICT PROPERLY SET ASIDE)/SLIP AND FALL (INTERNALLY INCONSISTENT VERDICT PROPERLY SET ASIDE)

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