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Although Not the Case Here, the Court Explained How a Collision Between a Vehicle Entering the Roadway and a Vehicle Which Is In the Roadway (and Has the Right-of-Way) Can Possibly Have Two Proximate Causes

The Second Department determined the defendant, who apparently struck plaintiff’s car as plaintiff pulled into traffic from a parking lot, was entitled to summary judgment.  Plaintiff was negligent as a matter of law based on a violation of Vehicle and Traffic law 1143, which requires a driver entering a roadway to yield to drivers within the right-of-way.  And there was no showing defendant was negligent.  The decision has a good explanation of how there can be two proximate causes of an accident under such facts (not the case here):

There can be more than one proximate cause of an accident …, because each driver has a duty to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances to avoid an accident … . As a result, even where there is evidence that another driver involved in the accident was negligent as a matter of law due to a violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, “the proponent of a summary judgment motion has the burden of establishing freedom from comparative negligence as a matter of law” … . Thus, a driver traveling with the right-of-way may nevertheless be found to have contributed to the happening of the accident if he or she did not use reasonable care to avoid the accident … . However, “[a] driver with the right-of-way who has only seconds to react to a vehicle that has failed to yield is not comparatively negligent for failing to avoid the collision” … . Desio v Cerebral Palsy Transp Inc, 2014 NY Slip Op 07322, 2nd Dept 10-29-14

 

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