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CRITERIA FOR A MOTION TO DISMISS NOT MET, SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DISMISSED BY MAKING A FINDING IN A MATTER PENDING BEFORE THE COMPTROLLER.

In an action stemming from the withholding of payment to plaintiff subcontractor, the Second Department determined the breach of contract cause of action should not have been dismissed, but noted that a conversion action cannot be based upon a breach of contract, and an unjust enrichment cause of action cannot coexist with a breach of contract cause of action.  Supreme Court had dismissed the breach of contract cause of action, finding the defendant had a legal right to withhold payment under Labor Law 220 because complaints had been lodged for failure to pay the prevailing wage for this school construction project. But since the Comptroller had not yet ruled on the Labor Law 220 complaints, Supreme Court should not have based its dismissal on them by making its own finding:

On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must “accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” … . While a court is “permitted to consider evidentiary material submitted by a defendant in support of a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7)” … , “where the motion is not converted to one for summary judgment, the criterion is whether the [third-party plaintiff] has a cause of action, not whether [it] has stated one, and, unless it has been shown that a material fact as claimed by the [third-party plaintiff] to be one is not a fact at all and unless it can be said that no significant dispute exists regarding it . . . dismissal should not eventuate'” … . A motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) may appropriately be granted “only where the documentary evidence utterly refutes plaintiff’s factual allegations, conclusively establishing a defense as a matter of law” … . * * *

The Supreme Court erred in dismissing the third-party cause of action alleging breach of contract on the ground that the third-party defendants had a legal right to withhold payment pursuant to Labor Law §§ 220 and 220-b. Based upon the record before us, there is no indication that the Comptroller has rendered a final determination regarding the alleged Labor Law § 220 violation. As such, the court, in effect, determined the prevailing wage issue, which is within the exclusive province of the Comptroller, prior to a determination by the Comptroller … . Thus, the evidentiary material submitted by the third-party defendants, which demonstrated that payment to AGC under the subject contracts was withheld pending the Comptroller’s determination, failed to establish that any fact alleged in support of the third-party breach of contract cause of action was undisputedly not a fact, and failed to conclusively establish a defense as a matter of law to that cause of action. Gym Door Repairs, Inc. v Astoria Gen. Contr. Corp., 2016 NY Slip Op 08047, 2nd Dept 11-30-16

 

CIVIL PROCEDURE (CRITERIA FOR A MOTION TO DISMISS NOT MET, SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DISMISSED BY MAKING A FINDING IN A MATTER PENDING BEFORE THE COMPTROLLER)/DISMISS, MOTION TO (CRITERIA FOR A MOTION TO DISMISS NOT MET, SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DISMISSED BY MAKING A FINDING IN A MATTER PENDING BEFORE THE COMPTROLLER)

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