You are here: / / Deliberately-Caused Collision Was Not An Accident from the Standpoint of...

Deliberately-Caused Collision Was Not An Accident from the Standpoint of the Insurer of the Driver Who Caused the Collision—However the Collision Was an Accident from the Standpoint of the Insurer of the Victim of the Deliberate Act—Therefore the Uninsured Motorist Endorsement In the Victim’s Policy Kicked In

The Second Department determined a collision caused by the deliberate act of one driver, Demoliere, was an “accident” for purposes of uninsured motorist endorsement of the policy held by the driver killed by the Demoliere’s deliberate act. The incident was not an accident from the standpoint of Demoliere, and that Demoliere’s insurer was therefore off the hook.  However, from the standpoint of the victim of the deliberate act, the incident was an accident covered by the uninsured motorist endorsement in the victim’s policy:

In State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Langan (16 NY3d 349), the Court of Appeals held that, for the purposes of an uninsured motorist endorsement, when an occurrence is “unexpected, unusual and unforeseen,” from the insured’s perspective, it qualifies as an “accident” (id. at 355 [internal quotation marks omitted]). Here, from the decedent’s perspective, her collision with Demoliere’s vehicle was unexpected, unusual, and unforeseen. Therefore, the occurrence constituted an “accident” within the meaning of the uninsured motorist endorsement of the decedent’s policy … . Matter of Utica Mut Ins Co v Burrous, 2014 NY Slip Op 06986, 2nd Dept 10-15-14

 

You might also like
THERE ARE QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT POLICE OFFICER ACTED IN RECKLESS DISREGARD FOR THE SAFETY OF OTHERS DURING A HIGH-SPEED CHASE; THE PURSUED CAR STRUCK PLAINTIFF’S CAR; THE ACTION AGAINST THE OFFICER AND THE TOWN SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO RENEW A MOTION FOR MORE TIME TO CONDUCT AN IME SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; CRITERIA EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT). ​
THE MAJORITY CONCLUDED THE ARGUMENT THAT DEFENSE COUNSEL SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO READ THE INDICTMENT TO THE JURY TO SHOW THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN THE ALLEGATIONS OF COERCION IN THE INDICTMENT AND THE PROOF AT TRIAL WAS RENDERED MOOT BY THE DISMISSAL OF THE COERCION COUNT; THE DISSENT ARGUED THE PROHIBITION DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF THE RIGHT TO PUT ON A DEFENSE (THIRD DEPT).
THE TRIAL JUDGE SHOULD HAVE PROCEEDED WITH BATSON INQUIRIES FOR THREE BLACK PROSPECTIVE JURORS; BASED ON THE JUDGE’S REMARKS THE MATTER WAS REMITTED FOR A HEARING AND REPORT BEFORE A DIFFERENT JUDGE (SECOND DEPT).
FAMILY COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED PETITION FOR GUARDIANSHIP AND MADE FINDINGS ALLOWING CHILD TO PETITION FOR SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS.
NEW YORK DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION OVER THE FLORIDA CHILD SUPPORT ORDER, EVEN THOUGH FATHER’S CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION HAD TERMINATED BY THE TERMS OF THE ORDER (SECOND DEPT).
Although the President of a Corporation Was Also a Member of Defendant Limited Liability Company, the Corporation and Limited Liability Were Not Shown to Be “United in Interest” Such that the “Relation-Back” Doctrine Would Apply to Allow Adding the Corporation as a Defendant After the Statute of Limitations Had Run
QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PLAINTIFF’S ACTIONS CONSTITUTED THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF HIS INJURIES IN THIS LABOR LAW 240(1) ACTION (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

Questions of Fact Raised About Fairness of Facially Valid Prenuptial Agreem... Defendant Failed to Demonstrate the Cause of Plaintiff’s Fall (a Ramp...