You are here: / / ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT GOULD DEMONSTRATED THE OTHER DRIVER, DEFENDANT PAPPAS,...
,

ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT GOULD DEMONSTRATED THE OTHER DRIVER, DEFENDANT PAPPAS, FAILED TO YIELD THE RIGHT-OF-WAY, DEFENDANT GOULD DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW VIOLATION WAS THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT, THEREFORE DEFENDANT GOULD WAS NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the defendant driver (Gould) who collided with another defendant driver (Pappas) who had failed to yield the right-of-way was not entitled to summary judgment, noting that there can be more than one proximate cause of an accident:

There can be more than one proximate cause of an accident'” … , and “[g]enerally, it is for the trier of fact to determine the issue of proximate cause” … .

While the driver with the right-of-way is entitled to assume that other drivers will obey the traffic laws requiring them to yield … , the driver with the right-of-way also has an obligation to keep a proper lookout and see what can be seen through the reasonable use of his or her senses to avoid colliding with other vehicles … .

The Gould defendants failed to establish their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the cross claims asserted against them. While they submitted evidence that the Pappas vehicle failed to yield the right-of-way to their vehicle, in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1142(a), the submissions in support of their motion failed to establish the Gould defendants’ freedom from fault and that the Pappas vehicle’s failure to yield the right-of-way was the sole proximate cause of the accident … . Based on their submissions, which included the deposition transcripts of the respective parties, the Gould defendants failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact as to whether Gould took reasonable care to avoid the collision … . Miron v Pappas, 2018 NY Slip Op 03672, Second Dept 5-23-18

​NEGLIGENCE (TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT GOULD DEMONSTRATED THE OTHER DRIVER, DEFENDANT PAPPAS, FAILED TO YIELD THE RIGHT-OF-WAY, DEFENDANT GOULD DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW VIOLATION WAS THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT, THEREFORE DEFENDANT GOULD WAS NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT))/TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS (ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT GOULD DEMONSTRATED THE OTHER DRIVER, DEFENDANT PAPPAS, FAILED TO YIELD THE RIGHT-OF-WAY, DEFENDANT GOULD DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW VIOLATION WAS THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT, THEREFORE DEFENDANT GOULD WAS NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT))/VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT GOULD DEMONSTRATED THE OTHER DRIVER, DEFENDANT PAPPAS, FAILED TO YIELD THE RIGHT-OF-WAY, DEFENDANT GOULD DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW VIOLATION WAS THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT, THEREFORE DEFENDANT GOULD WAS NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT))/PROXIMATE CAUSE (TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT GOULD DEMONSTRATED THE OTHER DRIVER, DEFENDANT PAPPAS, FAILED TO YIELD THE RIGHT-OF-WAY, DEFENDANT GOULD DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW VIOLATION WAS THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT, THEREFORE DEFENDANT GOULD WAS NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT))/VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW (TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT GOULD DEMONSTRATED THE OTHER DRIVER, DEFENDANT PAPPAS, FAILED TO YIELD THE RIGHT-OF-WAY, DEFENDANT GOULD DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW VIOLATION WAS THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT, THEREFORE DEFENDANT GOULD WAS NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT))

You might also like
PLAINTIFFS WERE ENTITLED TO AMEND THE BILL OF PARTICULARS TO THE EXTENT THE AMENDMENT AMPLIFIED THE ALLEGATIONS ALREADY MADE WITHOUT OBJECTION IN THE SUPPLEMENTAL BILL OF PARTICULARS (SECOND DEPT).
THE ARBITRATORS’ AWARD IN THIS RELIGIOUS DIVORCE PROCEEDING WAS NOT INVALID BECAUSE THE ARBRITRATORS DID NOT STATE THE REASONS FOR THE AWARD, AND THE AWARD WAS NOT INDEFINITE AND NONFINAL; SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE VACATED THE AWARD (SECOND DEPT).
Co-Tenant Acquired Entire Parcel by Adverse Possession
PROOF OF DEFENDANTS’ DEFAULT WAS INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY BECAUSE THE UNDERLYING BUSINESS RECORDS WERE NOT SUBMITTED WITH THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION (SECOND DEPT).
NO ONE MOVED TO QUASH THE NONJUDICIAL SUBPOENA SERVED ON A NONPARTY; SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED THE MOTION TO COMPEL THE NONPARTY’S APPEARANCE AT A DEPOSITION (SECOND DEPT).
INDUSTRIAL CODE PROVISION REQUIRING THAT SAFETY DEVICES BE KEPT SOUND AND OPERABLE CONSTITUTED A CONCRETE PREDICATE FOR A LABOR LAW 241 (6) CAUSE OF ACTION WHICH ALLEGED INJURY DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF A “PROTECTOR” ON A GRINDER.
QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER THE CONTINUOUS TREATMENT DOCTRINE RENDERED THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION TIMELY (SECOND DEPT).
STANDING EVIDENCE DID NOT MEET THE CRITERIA FOR THE BUSINESS RECORDS EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE, EVIDENCE THE LOAN WAS GOING TO BE USED FOR INVESTMENT PURPOSES RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE RPAPL NOTICE REQUIREMENTS FOR HOME LOANS APPLIED.

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

PLAINTIFFS’ EXPERT DID NOT SPECIALIZE IN THE RELEVANT AREA OF MEDICINE,... DEFENDANTS DID NOT DEMONSTRATE PLAINTIFF COULD NOT PROVE IT WAS READY, WILLING...