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PLAINTIFF’S PURCHASE OF NOTES WAS FOR THE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF BRINGING A LAWSUIT IN VIOLATION OF THE JUDICIARY LAW (CHAMPERTY STATUTE).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge DiFiore, over a two-judge dissent, determined plaintiff Jusitian Capital’s purchase of notes from DPAG was champertous (purchased for the primary purpose of bringing a lawsuit), and further determined Justinian was not entitled to the “safe harbor” provision of the champerty statute (which exempts securities purchased for “an aggregate purchase price of at least five hundred thousand dollars”):

… DPAG and Justinian entered into a sale and purchase agreement (the Agreement). Pursuant to the Agreement, DPAG would assign the Notes to Justinian and Justinian would agree to pay DPAG a base purchase price of $1,000,000 … . The Notes were assigned to Justinian shortly after execution of the Agreement. The assignment, however, was not contingent on Justinian’s payment of the $1,000,000. Nor did Justinian’s failure to pay the $1,000,000 constitute an Event of Default under section 9 of the Agreement. * * *

…[T]he impetus for the assignment of the Notes to Justinian was DPAG’s desire to sue [defendant] for causing the Notes’ decline in value and not be named as the plaintiff in the lawsuit. Justinian’s business plan, in turn, was acquiring investments that suffered major losses in order to sue on them, and it did so here within days after it was assigned the Notes. … [T]here was no evidence, even following completion of champerty-related discovery, that Justinian’s acquisition of the Notes was for any purpose other than the lawsuit it commenced almost immediately after acquiring the Notes … . * * *

The record establishes, and we conclude as a matter of law, that the $1,000,000 base purchase price listed in the Agreement was not a binding and bona fide obligation to pay the purchase price other than from the proceeds of the lawsuit. The Agreement was structured so that Justinian did not have to pay the purchase price unless the lawsuit was successful, in litigation or in settlement. Justinian Capital SPC v WestLB AG, 2016 NY Slip Op 07047, CtApp 10-27-16

 

DEBTOR-CREDITOR (PLAINTIFF’S PURCHASE OF NOTES WAS FOR THE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF BRINGING A LAWSUIT IN VIOLATION OF THE JUDICIARY LAW (CHAMPERTY STATUTE))/CHAMPERTY (PLAINTIFF’S PURCHASE OF NOTES WAS FOR THE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF BRINGING A LAWSUIT IN VIOLATION OF THE JUDICIARY LAW (CHAMPERTY STATUTE))

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