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Motion for a Change of Venue Can Be Entertained in “Dangerous Sex Offender” Trials and Hearings Under the Mental Hygiene Law/Non-Final Order Which Necessarily Affects the Final Order Is Appealable

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Lippman, determined that “dangerous sex offender” trials and hearings under the Mental Hygiene Law are subject to the change of venue procedures under the CPLR.  Here, after the motion for a change of venue was denied, the petitioner refused to attend the hearing.  The Court of Appeals noted that the denial of the motion to change venue, although a non-final order, was appealable because it necessarily affected the final order:

Mental Hygiene Law § 10.08 (e) provides that “[a]t any hearing or trial pursuant to the provisions of this article, the court may change the venue of the trial to any county for good cause, which may include considerations relating to the convenience of the parties or witnesses or the condition of the respondent.”  * * * The construction of the provision is somewhat ambiguous, in that, if the legislature intended to restrict a change of venue to article 10 trials, the reference to “any hearing or trial” would appear to be superfluous. We see no need to read a restriction into the statute limiting annual review hearings solely to the few counties where secure treatment facilities are located.

However, petitioner failed to establish good cause for the change of venue. As noted above, the statute provides that good cause “may include considerations relating to the convenience of the parties or witnesses or the condition of the respondent” (Mental Hygiene Law § 10.08 [e]). The affidavit submitted in support of the motion did urge, generally, that it would be inconvenient and burdensome for unnamed family members and other potential witnesses to travel to Oneida County, but failed to identify a single witness that would testify on petitioner’s behalf. Nor did the affidavit set forth the subject of any proposed testimony — let alone identify any information that would be potentially relevant to the issue of whether petitioner remained a dangerous sex offender in need of confinement. Therefore, the motion for a change of venue was properly denied. Matter of Tyrone D v State of New York, 2015 NY Slip Op 01301, CtApp 2-13-15

 

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