The Fourth Department determined the “serious crime” defamation per se cause of action should have been dismissed. The defamation action stemmed from a letter written to a federal judge by the defendant, in connection with plaintiff-corporation’s pleading guilty to a violation of the Clean Water Act:
Supreme Court erred in denying that part of her pre-answer motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) insofar as the complaint alleged that defendant committed defamation per se by “charging plaintiff[s] with a serious crime” … . We conclude that certain statements in the letter alleging criminal conduct on the part of plaintiffs do not constitute defamation per se because “reference to extrinsic facts is necessary to give them a defamatory import” … , and that other statements, e.g., accusing plaintiffs of terrorism, do not constitute defamation per se because they are “likely to be perceived as rhetorical hyperbole [or] a vigorous epithet’ ” … . Crane-Hogan Structural Sys., Inc. v Belding, 2016 NY Slip Op 06376, 4th Dept 9-30-16
DEFAMATION (SERIOUS-CRIME DEFAMATION PER SE CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED)