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NO FOUNDATION FOR RECANTATION EVIDENCE COULD BE LAID BECAUSE THE ALLEGED VICTIM REFUSED TO TESTIFY; TRIAL COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE ALLOWED VICTIM’S TESTIMONY FROM THE FIRST TRIAL TO BE ADMITTED WITHOUT EXPLORING WHETHER THE TESTIMONY SHOULD BE STRUCK BECAUSE IT WAS CENTRAL TO THE PROSECUTION’S CASE; TRIAL COURT ACTED VINDICTIVELY BY IMPOSING A HARSHER SENTENCE AFTER RETRIAL.

The Fourth Department, reversing defendant’s conviction, determined that allowing the alleged victim’s testimony from the first trial to be read into evidence in the second trial violated the defendant’s right to confrontation. After the first trial, the victim recanted and told defense counsel and the prosecutor someone else committed the offense. At defendant’s second trial, the victim refused to testify, exercising her 5th amendment right to remain silent. Because the victim could not be asked about her recantation, and therefore no foundation for the recantation evidence could be laid, the victim’s testimony from the first trial was deemed admissible. However, under the facts, the victim’s assertion of her 5th amendment rights required the trial judge to explore whether her testimony in the first trial should be struck because her testimony was central to the prosecution’s case. In addition, the Fourth Department determined the trial judge acted vindictively when a greater sentence was imposed after the second trial:

… [The defendant’s] Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was violated when the victim exercised her Fifth Amendment right to remain silent and refused to answer defense counsel’s questions regarding the recantation of her testimony because the court failed in its duty “[to] explore whether [she] ha[d] essentially refused to testify on questions of matters so closely related to the commission of the crime[s] that [some or all of her] testimony . . . [from the first trial] should be stricken” … . We note, too, that the victim’s testimony is central to the People’s case … and, given that we have previously determined that the evidence against defendant is “less than overwhelming” … , we cannot conclude that the court’s error is harmless … .

We therefore reverse the judgment and grant a new trial on counts one, two and four of the indictment. In the interest of judicial economy, we exercise our power to review as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice defendant’s contention that the court failed to rebut the presumption of vindictiveness when it imposed a greater sentence than was imposed following the first trial … . The People correctly concede that the court failed to identify ” conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the time of the original sentencing proceeding’ ” to justify an increased sentence … , and thus we conclude that the court erred in increasing the sentence after the retrial … . People v Hicks, 2016 NY Slip Op 06334, 4th Dept 9-30-16

 

CRIMINAL LAW (NO FOUNDATION FOR RECANTATION EVIDENCE COULD BE LAID BECAUSE THE ALLEGED VICTIM REFUSED TO TESTIFY; TRIAL COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE ALLOWED VICTIM’S TESTIMONY FROM THE FIRST TRIAL TO BE ADMITTED WITHOUT EXPLORING WHETHER THE TESTIMONY SHOULD BE STRUCK BECAUSE IT WAS CENTRAL TO THE PROSECUTION’S CASE; TRIAL COURT ACTED VINDICTIVELY BY IMPOSING A HARSHER SENTENCE AFTER RETRIAL)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, NO FOUNDATION FOR RECANTATION EVIDENCE COULD BE LAID BECAUSE THE ALLEGED VICTIM REFUSED TO TESTIFY; TRIAL COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE ALLOWED VICTIM’S TESTIMONY FROM THE FIRST TRIAL TO BE ADMITTED WITHOUT EXPLORING WHETHER THE TESTIMONY SHOULD BE STRUCK BECAUSE IT WAS CENTRAL TO THE PROSECUTION’S CASE; TRIAL COURT ACTED VINDICTIVELY BY IMPOSING A HARSHER SENTENCE AFTER RETRIAL)/RECANTATION (CRIMINAL LAW, NO FOUNDATION FOR RECANTATION EVIDENCE COULD BE LAID BECAUSE THE ALLEGED VICTIM REFUSED TO TESTIFY; TRIAL COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE ALLOWED VICTIM’S TESTIMONY FROM THE FIRST TRIAL TO BE ADMITTED WITHOUT EXPLORING WHETHER THE TESTIMONY SHOULD BE STRUCK BECAUSE IT WAS CENTRAL TO THE PROSECUTION’S CASE; TRIAL COURT ACTED VINDICTIVELY BY IMPOSING A HARSHER SENTENCE AFTER RETRIAL)/SENTENCING (TRIAL COURT ACTED VINDICTIVELY BY IMPOSING A HARSHER SENTENCE AFTER RETRIAL)

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EVIDENCE SEIZED FROM DEFENDANT’S PERSON BEFORE THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE... SERIOUS-CRIME DEFAMATION CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED.