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Employer Not Required to Accommodate Employee with Epilepsy with Permanent Light-Duty Assignment

The Fourth Department determined petitioner’s employer, the Erie County Sheriff’s Office (ECSO), was not required to accommodate the petitioner, who has epilepsy, with permanent light duty employment:

“Pursuant to Executive Law § 296 (3) (b), employers are required to make reasonable accommodations to disabled employees, provided that the accommodations do not impose an undue hardship on the employer. A reasonable accommodation is defined in relevant part as an action that permits an employee with a disability to perform his or her job activities in a reasonable manner” (… see § 292 [21-e]). “In reviewing the determAdd Newination of SDHR’s Commissioner, this Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner . . . , and we must confirm the determination so long as it is based on substantial evidence’ ” … .

Petitioner, a deputy sheriff assigned to the position of “inmate escort” at ECSO’s correctional facility, does not dispute that her epilepsy does not permit her to be assigned to duties involving direct inmate contact, i.e., duties that require uninterrupted vigilance and emergency response capability … . Thus, petitioner also does not dispute that she cannot perform the essential functions of an “inmate escort” without presenting a direct threat to her own safety and others in the workplace (see 42 USC § 12113 [b]…). In order to accommodate her disability, however, petitioner ultimately requested assignment to a light-duty position. It is well settled that an employer is neither required to create a new light-duty position to accommodate a disability (see 9 NYCRR 466.11 [f] [6]…), nor to assign an employee with more than a temporary disability to a position in a light-duty program designed to accommodate only temporary disabilities … . The fact that an employer has been lax in enforcing the temporary nature of its light-duty policy does not convert the policy into a permanent one … . Although ECSO maintained a “light-duty” program (Policy # 03-01-07, Light Duty Assignments), the purpose of that program is to assist employees with temporary disabilities by modifying work assignments and duties or arranging for a temporary transfer to a “Transitional Duty Assignment (TDA)” until the employee is medically released to resume regular duties. The express intent of ECSO’s “policy is not to create a permanent Transitional Duty Assignment, nor is [the policy] to be used in cases where an employee cannot perform the essential functions of a job with reasonable accommodation.” Petitioner’s epilepsy seizure disorder was described by her own treating physician as “long-term.” Thus, we conclude that there is no basis to disturb SDHR’s (State Division of Human Rights’) determination that petitioner’s disability was of a permanent nature and that ECSO had no permanent light-duty police assignments available. Matter of Coles v New York State Div of Human Rights, 2014 NY Slip Op 07788, 4th Dept 11-14-14

Similar issue and result in Matter of County of Erie v New York State Div of Human Rights, 2014 NY Slip Op 07829, 4th Dept 11-14-14

 

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