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EVIDENCE SEIZED FROM DEFENDANT’S PERSON BEFORE THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED; HOWEVER EVIDENCE COLLECTED AFTER THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE WAS NOT THE FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE.

The Fourth Department determined items seized from defendant’s person at the time he was detained should have been suppressed. However, a subsequent show-up identification, statements, and items found where defendant was initially seized were not fruit of the poisonous tree:

Defendant contends that he was unlawfully arrested prior to the showup identification procedure and that all of the physical evidence, as well as the identification testimony and his statements, must be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. We agree with defendant that the items seized from his person should have been suppressed because the police did not have probable cause at that time to arrest him and conduct a search incident to an arrest. We conclude that the police had reasonable suspicion to pursue defendant and detain him for the purpose of the showup identification … . But although the police were permitted at that time to conduct a pat frisk of defendant … , they were not permitted to search him.

We reject defendant’s contention, however, insofar as he asserts that the remaining evidence must be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. It is well settled that “only evidence which is the fruit of the poisonous tree’ should be excluded” … . In other words, “only evidence which has been come at by exploitation of that illegality should be suppressed” … . Here, defendant did not meet his burden of establishing that the showup identification of him, his statements to the police, and the items seized in the courtyard, were causally related to his unlawful arrest prior to the showup identification procedure … , i.e., that such evidence was ” obtained by exploitation’ ” of the illegal arrest … . People v Ashford, 2016 NY Slip Op 06365, 4th Dept 9-30-16

 

CRIMINAL LAW (EVIDENCE SEIZED FROM DEFENDANT’S PERSON BEFORE THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED; HOWEVER EVIDENCE COLLECTED AFTER THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE WAS NOT THE FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, EVIDENCE SEIZED FROM DEFENDANT’S PERSON BEFORE THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED; HOWEVER EVIDENCE COLLECTED AFTER THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE WAS NOT THE FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE)/SUPPRESSION (CRIMINAL LAW, EVIDENCE SEIZED FROM DEFENDANT’S PERSON BEFORE THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED; HOWEVER EVIDENCE COLLECTED AFTER THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE WAS NOT THE FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE)

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