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DEFENDANT, DESPITE BEING IN CUSTODY AT THE TIME, VALIDLY CONSENTED TO THE SEARCH OF THE PREMISES AND A DUFFEL BAG FOUND IN A CLOSET.

The Fourth Department, over an extensive, two-justice dissent, determined defendant, when he was in custody, consented to the search of the premises and a duffel bag in a closet:

Testimony at the suppression hearing established that, although defendant was in custody at the time he gave consent, he cooperated with the police and assisted them in gaining entry by indicating which of his keys opened the front door … . Once inside the home, the police observed marihuana in plain view and immediately read defendant his Miranda rights. After defendant waived those rights, he voluntarily consented, both verbally and in writing, to a search of the premises.

We reject defendant’s further contention that any voluntary consent he may have given did not encompass a search of a duffel bag inside of his closet. “The standard for measuring the scope of a suspect’s consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of objective reasonableness—what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect?” … . Where an officer informs a suspect of the specific items the officer is searching for, ” [t]he scope of a search is generally defined by its expressed object’ ” … . Here, defendant responded affirmatively when the officer asked him whether he “could have permission to search both the room and the house for drugs or any other weapons or illegal contraband in the house.” Additionally, defendant signed a written consent that included the “premises” and his “personal property.” People v Freeman, 2016 NY Slip Op 05472, 4th Dept 7-8-16

 

CRIMINAL LAW (DEFENDANT, DESPITE BEING IN CUSTODY AT THE TIME, VALIDLY CONSENTED TO THE SEARCH OF THE PREMISES AND A DUFFEL BAG FOUND IN A CLOSET)/SEARCH (DEFENDANT, DESPITE BEING IN CUSTODY AT THE TIME, VALIDLY CONSENTED TO THE SEARCH OF THE PREMISES AND A DUFFEL BAG FOUND IN A CLOSET)/CONSENT SEARCH (DEFENDANT, DESPITE BEING IN CUSTODY AT THE TIME, VALIDLY CONSENTED TO THE SEARCH OF THE PREMISES AND A DUFFEL BAG FOUND IN A CLOSET)/SUPPRESSION (DEFENDANT, DESPITE BEING IN CUSTODY AT THE TIME, VALIDLY CONSENTED TO THE SEARCH OF THE PREMISES AND A DUFFEL BAG FOUND IN A CLOSET)

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