You are here: / / COUNTY COURT COULD NOT LEGALLY FULFILL THE SENTENCING PROMISE THAT INDUCED...

COUNTY COURT COULD NOT LEGALLY FULFILL THE SENTENCING PROMISE THAT INDUCED DEFENDANT’S GUILTY PLEA, PLEA VACATED AND THE MATTER REMITTED FOR THE IMPOSITION OF A SENTENCE WHICH COMPORTS WITH DEFENDANT’S EXPECTATIONS (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined defendant’s guilty plea was induced by a sentencing promise County Court could not fulfill. The plea was vacated and the matter was remitted for imposition of a sentence that comports with defendant’s expectations:

Penal Law § 70.30 (3) provides that “the maximum term of an indeterminate sentence imposed on a person shall be credited with and diminished by the amount of time the person spent in custody prior to the commencement of such sentence as a result of the charge that culminated in the sentence.” Penal Law § 70.30 (3) further provides that “[i]n the case of an indeterminate sentence, if the minimum period of imprisonment has been fixed by the court . . . , the credit shall also be applied against the minimum period.” That credit, however, “shall not include any time that is credited against the term . . . of any previously imposed sentence . . . to which the person is subject” … . Thus, “a person is prohibited from receiving jail time credit against a subsequent sentence when such credit has already been applied to time served on a previous sentence’ ” … . Inasmuch as defendant was serving a sentence on a prior conviction throughout the instant proceedings, the court could not legally fulfill its promise to credit defendant’s jail time against his sentence in this matter.

It is well established that “[a] guilty plea induced by an unfulfilled promise either must be vacated or the promise honored” … . “Where, as here, the originally promised sentence cannot be imposed in strict compliance with the plea agreement, the sentencing court may impose another lawful sentence that comports with the defendant’s legitimate expectations” … . People v Mccullen, 2019 NY Slip Op 03180, Fourth Dept 4-26-19

 

You might also like
THE PRESENCE OF PLAINTIFF’S REPRESENTATIVE IN AN EXAMINATION OF PLAINTIFF BY DEFENDANT’S PHYSICIAN WAS NOT WAIVED, EXCLUSION OF THE REPRESENTATIVE WARRANTED SANCTIONS.
DEFENDANT CAR DEALERSHIP OWNED THE CAR IN WHICH PLAINTIFF, ITS SALESMAN, WAS INJURED DURING A TEST DRIVE; THE DEALERSHIP, AS PLAINTIFF’S EMPLOYER, IS IMMUNE FROM SUIT UNDER THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW AND IS NOT VICARIOUSLY LIABLE AS THE OWNER OF THE CAR UNDER THE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW (FOURTH DEPT).
DEFENDANT PLED GUILTY TO TWO COUNTS OF CRIMINAL POSSESSION OF A WEAPON; MONTHS LATER THE PEOPLE INDICTED THE DEFENDANT ON A MURDER CHARGE, BASED ON THE SAME FACTS; COUNTY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE GRANTED DEFENDANT’S CPL 40.40 MOTION TO DISMISS THE MURDER INDICTMENT; THERE WAS A STRONG, COMPREHENSIVE DISSENT (FOURTH DEPT).
JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, ASSESSED POINTS ON A THEORY NOT RAISED BY THE BOARD OF EXAMINERS OF SEX OFFENDERS OR THE PEOPLE; DEFENDANT WAS THEREBY DEPRIVED OF HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW (FOURTH DEPT).
Power Company Must Pay Town’s Ad Valorem Sewer Taxes Whether Or Not It Owns the Land On Which Its Transmission Facilities Are Located and Whether or Not It Produces Sewage
BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY CAUSE OF ACTION MUST BE PLED WITH PARTICULARITY (FOURTH DEPT).
A DEPOSITION ERRATA SHEET SUBMITTED PAST THE 60-DAY DEADLINE SHOULD HAVE BEEN STRUCK (FOURTH DEPT). ​
RISK LEVEL REDUCED FROM THREE TO TWO; DEFENDANT AND VICTIM WERE CLOSE IN AGE AND THE LACK OF CONSENT WAS SOLELY BY VIRTUE OF THE VICTIM’S AGE.

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

FOR CAUSE JUROR CHALLENGES SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, JURORS COULD NOT UNEQUIVOCALLY... THE ATTORNEY GENERAL DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO PROSECUTE DEFENDANT IN THIS...