You are here: / / COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN ATTORNEYS IN A LAW FIRM AND THE FIRM’S IN...
,

COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN ATTORNEYS IN A LAW FIRM AND THE FIRM’S IN HOUSE COUNSEL CONCERNING ETHICAL ISSUES IN A FORMER CLIENT’S CASE PROTECTED FROM DISCLOSURE IN THE FORMER CLIENT’S MALPRACTICE ACTION.

The First Department, in an extensive full-fledged opinion by Justice Friedman (which cannot be fairly summarized here), determined the communications between attorneys in a law firm and the firm’s in house counsel were protected by attorney-client privilege and were not subject to the fiduciary exception to the privilege. The communications were sought by plaintiff, a former client of the firm, who brought the instant malpractice action against the firm:

The primary issue on this appeal is whether attorneys who have sought the advice of their law firm’s in-house general counsel on their ethical obligations in representing a firm client may successfully invoke attorney-client privilege to resist the client’s demand for the disclosure of communications seeking or giving such advice. We hold that such communications are not subject to disclosure to the client under the fiduciary exception to the attorney-client privilege … because, for purposes of the in-firm consultation on the ethical issue, the attorneys seeking the general counsel’s advice, as well as the firm itself, were the general counsel’s ” real clients'” … . Further, we decline to adopt the “current client exception,” under which a number of courts of other jurisdictions … have held a former client entitled to disclosure by a law firm of any in-firm communications relating to the client that took place while the firm was representing that client. Because we also find unavailing the former client’s remaining arguments for compelling the law firm and one of its attorneys to disclose the in-firm attorney-client communications in question, we reverse the order appealed from and deny the motion to compel. Stock v Schnader Harrison Segal & Lewis LLP, 2016 NY Slip Op 05247, 1st Dept 6-30-16

 

ATTORNEYS (PRIVILEGE, COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN ATTORNEYS IN A LAW FIRM AND THE FIRM’S IN HOUSE COUNSEL CONCERNING A FORMER CLIENT’S CASE PROTECTED FROM DISCLOSURE IN THE FORMER CLIENT’S MALPRACTICE ACTION)/PRIVILEGE (ATTORNEY-CLIENT,COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN ATTORNEYS IN A LAW FIRM AND THE FIRM’S IN HOUSE COUNSEL CONCERNING A FORMER CLIENT’S CASE PROTECTED FROM DISCLOSURE IN THE FORMER CLIENT’S MALPRACTICE ACTION)/ATTONNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE (COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN ATTORNEYS IN A LAW FIRM AND THE FIRM’S IN HOUSE COUNSEL CONCERNING A FORMER CLIENT’S CASE PROTECTED FROM DISCLOSURE IN THE FORMER CLIENT’S MALPRACTICE ACTION)/FIDUCIARY EXCEPTION (ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE, COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN ATTORNEYS IN A LAW FIRM AND THE FIRM’S IN HOUSE COUNSEL CONCERNING A FORMER CLIENT’S CASE PROTECTED FROM DISCLOSURE IN THE FORMER CLIENT’S MALPRACTICE ACTION)/MALPRACTICE (ATTORNEYS, COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN ATTORNEYS IN A LAW FIRM AND THE FIRM’S IN HOUSE COUNSEL CONCERNING A FORMER CLIENT’S CASE PROTECTED FROM DISCLOSURE IN THE FORMER CLIENT’S MALPRACTICE ACTION)

You might also like
IN THIS SIDEWALK SLIP AND FALL CASE, THE SUPPORT POLE FOR THE SIDEWALK TENT FURNISHED THE OCCASION FOR THE SLIP AND FALL BY REQUIRING PLAINTIFF TO CHOOSE WHICH SIDE OF THE POLE TO WALK ON BUT WAS NOT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE SLIP AND FALL (FIRST DEPT).
DESPITE THE BRAKE-FAILURE ALLEGATION IN THIS REAR-END COLLISION CASE, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; DEFENDANT DID NOT PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO RAISE A QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT BRAKE FAILURE (FIRST DEPT).
DEFENDANT’S FOR CAUSE CHALLENGE TO A PROSPECTIVE JUROR WHO SAID HE WAS ‘NOT SURE’ HE COULD BE IMPARTIAL SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, CONVICTION REVERSED (FIRST DEPT).
STANDING ON THE TOP STEP OF AN A FRAME LADDER WAS NOT THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE PLAINTIFF’S FALL; SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED.
PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION IN THIS FALLING OBJECT CASE; QUESTION OF FACT ON HIS LABOR LAW 241 (6) CAUSE OF ACTION (FIRST DEPT).
ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF IS A NEW JERSEY RESIDENT WORKING FOR A NONDOMICILIARY EMPLOYER, SHE WAS REQUIRED TO MAKE REGULAR VISITS TO HER EMPLOYER’S CLIENT IN NEW YORK CITY; PLAINTIFF ALLEGED SHE WAS SEXUALLY HARASSED, IN NEW YORK CITY, BY THE CLIENT’S EMPLOYEE; BECAUSE THE ALLEGED DISCRIMINATORY CONDUCT “HAD AN IMPACT IN NEW YORK,” NEW YORK HAD SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION FOR THE HUMAN RIGHTS LAW CAUSES OF ACTION (FIRST DEPT).
NOTHING IN DEFENDANT’S CRIMINAL HISTORY INVOLVED SUBSTANCE ABUSE OR WEAPONS; THEREFORE THE PROBATION CONDITION THAT DEFENDANT SUBMIT TO SEARCHES OF HIS PERSON, VEHICLE AND HOME WAS STRUCK (FIRST DEPT).
THE PEOPLE DID NOT DEMONSTRATE AN INVENTORY LIST WAS CREATED FOR THE SEARCH OF DEFENDANT’S CAR; THEREFORE THE PEOPLE DID NOT PROVE THE SEARCH WAS A VALID “INVENTORY SEARCH” (FIRST DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

EVIDENCE OF PRIOR BAD ACTS BY DEFENDANT PHYSICIAN SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED... BROADER FLORIDA STATUTE COULD NOT PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR SECOND FELONY OFFENDER...