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INFANCY DOES NOT TOLL 90-DAY PERIOD FOR FILING A NOTICE OF CLAIM, MOTION FOR LEAVE FILE A LATE NOTICE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiffs' motion for leave to file a late notice of claim against defendant school district should have been denied. Although infancy tolls the one-year-ninety-days statute of limitations, it does not toll the 90-day period for filing a notice of claim. The motion for leave to file a late notice was not made until more than four years after the expiration of the 90-day filing period:

Here, the plaintiffs failed to establish that the defendant had “acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim” within 90 days of the accident or a reasonable time thereafter (General Municipal Law § 50-e[5]). The school's principal prepared an accident claim form on the day of the accident, and the infant plaintiff's parents completed the medical claim portion of that form a couple of weeks after the accident. Contrary to the plaintiffs' contention, this form, which merely indicated that the infant plaintiff lost his left front tooth and part of his right front tooth when he hit his mouth on the gymnasium floor in an attempt to “duck from a ball” during physical education class, did not establish that the defendant had timely, actual knowledge of the essential facts underlying the claims that it was negligent in supervising the students, in failing to provide a safe play area, and in allowing the infant plaintiff to engage in an inappropriate activity … . Accordingly, the defendant had no reason to conduct a prompt investigation into the purported negligent supervision and alleged unsafe condition of the gymnasium floor … . Horn v Bellmore Union Free Sch. Dist., 2016 NY Slip Op 04021, 2nd Dept 5-25-16

NEGLIGENCE (INFANCY DOES NOT TOLL 90-DAY PERIOD FOR FILING A NOTICE OF CLAIM, MOTION FOR LEAVE FILE A LATE NOTICE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/CIVIL PROCEDURE (INFANCY DOES NOT TOLL 90-DAY PERIOD FOR FILING A NOTICE OF CLAIM, MOTION FOR LEAVE FILE A LATE NOTICE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW (INFANCY DOES NOT TOLL 90-DAY PERIOD FOR FILING A NOTICE OF CLAIM, MOTION FOR LEAVE FILE A LATE NOTICE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/MUNICIPAL LAW (INFANCY DOES NOT TOLL 90-DAY PERIOD FOR FILING A NOTICE OF CLAIM, MOTION FOR LEAVE FILE A LATE NOTICE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED)

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