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STUDENT ASSUMED THE RISK OF BEING STRUCK BY A BASEBALL.

The Second Department determined plaintiff-student assumed the risk of being struck by a baseball during his high-school team’s practice:

“The assumption of risk doctrine applies where a consenting participant in sporting and amusement activities is aware of the risks; has an appreciation of the nature of the risks; and voluntarily assumes the risks'” … . “An educational institution organizing a team sporting activity must exercise ordinary reasonable care to protect student athletes voluntarily participating in organized athletics from unassumed, concealed, or enhanced risks” … . “Defendant’s duty under such circumstances is a duty to exercise care to make the conditions as safe as they appear to be” … . “If the risks of the activity are fully comprehended or perfectly obvious, plaintiff has consented to them and defendant has performed its duty” … . “[I]t is not necessary to the application of the doctrine that the injured plaintiff may have foreseen the exact manner in which the injury occurred so long as he or she is aware of the potential for injury of the mechanism from which the injury results'” … . Kaminer v Jericho Union Free Sch. Dist., 2016 NY Slip Op 04024, 2nd Dept 5-25-16

 

NEGLIGENCE (STUDENT ASSUMED THE RISK OF BEING STRUCK BY A BASEBALL)/ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK (STUDENT ASSUMED THE RISK OF BEING STRUCK BY A BASEBALL)/EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW (STUDENT ASSUMED THE RISK OF BEING STRUCK BY A BASEBALL)

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