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POLICE OFFICER’S GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW 205-E CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, CRITERIA FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT NOT MET BY POINTING TO GAPS IN OTHER PARTY’S PROOF.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the dismissal of plaintiff police officer's negligence cause of action did not mandate dismissal of the General Municipal Law 205-e cause of action. Plaintiff alleged his slip and fall injury resulted from defendant's failure to comply with specified regulations. In its motion for summary judgment, defendant did not affirmatively demonstrate the regulations were not breached. The court noted that simply pointing to gaps in plaintiff's proof is not enough in the summary judgment context:

…[T]he dismissal of the plaintiff's common-law negligence cause of action was not fatal, as a matter of law, to his General Municipal Law § 205-e cause of action. In order to recover under General Municipal Law § 205-e, the statute does not mandate that the plaintiff establish general negligence, but rather, negligence of any person in “failing to comply” with the requirements of, inter alia, a regulation … , or ” negligent noncompliance with a requirement found in a well-developed body of law and regulation that imposes clear duties'” … . Furthermore, while the plaintiff alleged in his consolidated complaint that the defendants violated certain identified regulations, the defendants failed to affirmatively demonstrate in their submissions to the Supreme Court that these regulations were not breached. A defendant's prima facie burden on a motion for summary judgment cannot be met by pointing to gaps in the plaintiff's case … . Vaughn v Veolia Transp., Inc., 2016 NY Slip Op 02985, 2nd Dept 4-20-16


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