You are here: / / HERE THE FRAMING COMPANY HIRED BY THE GENERAL CONTRACTOR AND GIVEN SUPERVISORY...
,

HERE THE FRAMING COMPANY HIRED BY THE GENERAL CONTRACTOR AND GIVEN SUPERVISORY CONTROL OVER PLAINTIFF’S WORK WAS LIABLE FOR PLAINTIFF’S INJURY AS A “STATUTORY AGENT” OF THE GENERAL CONTRACTOR WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE LABOR LAW 240 (1) (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant South Ocean Framing was a statutory agent liable for plaintiff’s injury pursuant to  Labor Law 240(1). The general contractor hired South Ocean Framing, which in turn subcontracted the framing work to plaintiff’s employer. Plaintiff stepped on a beam which flipped out from under him and he fell 15 feet. He was entitled to summary judgment. With respect to the statutory-agent question, the court wrote:

Contrary to South Ocean’s … contention, it is liable under Labor Law § 240(1) as a statutory agent of the owner or general contractor, since it had the authority to supervise and control the particular work in which the plaintiff was engaged at the time of his injury .. . Once South Ocean became such an agent, it could not escape liability by delegating its work to another entity [i.e., plaintiff’s employer]. Mogrovejo v HG Hous. Dev. Fund Co., Inc., 2022 NY Slip Op 04299, Second Dept 7-6-22

Practice Point: The general contractor hired the framing company. The framing company hired plaintiff’s employer to do the framing. Because the framing company had supervisory control over plaintiff’s work, it was liable for plaintiff’s injury as a statutory agent under Labor Law 240 (1) and could not escape liability by delegating its supervisory role.

 

You might also like
EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANT JOINED A CONSPIRACY TO MURDER WAS LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT, MOTION FOR A TRIAL ORDER OF DISMISSAL SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
THE REFEREE’S FINDINGS WERE BASED UPON INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY, JUDGMENT OF FORECLOSURE REVERSED (SECOND DEPT).
The Public Administrators of Two Counties Claimed the Authority and Jurisdiction for Letters of Administration Re: the Estate of an Incapacitated Person—In Resolving the Dispute the Appellate Court Discussed the Authority of a Public Administrator As Well As Surrogate’s Court’s Jurisdiction and the Decedent’s Domicile
PROOF OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF RPAPL 1304 WAS INSUFFICIENT; THE BANK’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
CRITERIA FOR DISCLOSURE OF ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS FOR FORENSIC TESTING EXPLAINED, NOT MET HERE.
THE WAS NO PROOF DEFENDANT VOLUNTARILY WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO BE PRESENT AT THE SORA RISK-LEVEL HEARING; ORDER REVERSED AND MATTER REMITTED FOR A NEW HEARING (SECOND DEPT).
AN AFFIDAVIT FROM A WITNESS TO THIS REAR-END TRAFFIC ACCIDENT STATING THAT PLAINTIFF WAS BACKING UP AT THE TIME DEFENDANT’S CAR STRUCK PLAINTIFF’S RAISED ONLY A QUESTION OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPARATIVE FAULT WHICH WILL NOT DEFEAT PLANTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT).
COUNTY NOT IMMUNE FROM SUIT ALLEGING NEGLIGENT MAINTENANCE OF DRAINAGE SYSTEM; INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR MAY BE LIABLE FOR LAUNCHING AN INSTRUMENT OF HARM; FLOOD DAMAGE RESULTED FROM DREDGING OPERATION.

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

PLAINTIFF BANK DID NOT PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH... THE CASUALTY CLAUSE IN THE LEASE DID NOT APPLY TO EXCUSE DEFENDANT-TENANT’S...