You are here: / / DEFENDANTS LIABLE UNDER A GRATUITOUS BAILMENT THEORY FOR DESTROYED GOODS;...

DEFENDANTS LIABLE UNDER A GRATUITOUS BAILMENT THEORY FOR DESTROYED GOODS; PROPER WAY TO CALCULATE DAMAGES FOR THE DESTROYED GOODS UNDER A CONTRACT THEORY EXPLAINED.

The Second Department determined the verdict in this bailment/contract action should not have been set aside as a matter of law under a gratuitous bailment theory, but was properly set aside because the damages amount was not supported by the evidence. A new trial was ordered on damages only. The plaintiff is a horse breeder and defendants were storing frozen semen from plaintiff's stallion free of charge. Somehow the semen thawed and was therefore destroyed. The Second Department held the defendants were liable under a gratuitous bailment theory because the failure to return the stored goods is evidence of gross negligence. The court went on to find that the market value of the portion of the stored semen which was not under contract for sale had not been proven:

In a gratuitous bailment, the bailee is only liable to the bailor for the bailee's gross negligence. However, “the failure to return the object bailed establishes a prima facie case of gross negligence, requiring the bailee to come forward with an explanation” … . Here, the defendants failed to return the plaintiff's property, which was destroyed while in their possession, and further failed to come forward with an explanation to negate the resulting prima facie case of gross negligence. * * *

…[P]laintiff submitted evidence of executed contracts for the sale of 16 of the destroyed straws of semen to various breeders at the price of $1,000 per straw. Since the amount of lost profits associated with these contracted sales was certain and definite, the plaintiff was entitled to an award of $16,000 for the loss of these 16 straws … . However, with respect to the remaining 194 straws that were destroyed, for which no contracts to purchase had been executed, the proper measure of market value is the price at which they could be replaced with a product of similar quality and characteristics in the market that existed immediately before their loss … . Reed v Cornell Univ., 2016 NY Slip Op 02797, 2nd Dept 4-13-16


You might also like
E-MAILS CONSTITUTED NONACTIONABLE OPINION AND POSTED FLYERS PROTECTED BY COMMON INTEREST PRIVILEGE.
PROSECUTOR’S IMPROPER REMARKS DESIGNED TO ELICIT THE JURY’S SYMPATHY FOR THE VICTIM DID NOT DEPRIVE DEFENDANT OF A FAIR TRIAL, HOWEVER A NEW TRIAL ON THE MURDER CHARGE IS REQUIRED BECAUSE THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRONEOUSLY DENIED DEFENDANT’S REQUEST TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF MANSLAUGHTER (SECOND DEPT).
PLAINTIFF BANK DID NOT DEMONSTRATE STANDING TO BRING THE FORECLOSURE ACTION; THE REQUIRED BUSINESS RECORDS WERE NOT SUBMITTED (SECOND DEPT).
FAILURE TO UPDATE THE ADDRESS ON FILE WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES (DMV) DOES NOT, STANDING ALONE, ESTOP THE DEFENDANT FROM CONTESTING SERVICE OF PROCESS (SECOND DEPT).
UNDER THE EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT, PETITIONER, AN INMATE WHO WAS INITIALLY DENIED ENTRY INTO A PRISON NURSERY PROGRAM FOR HER AND HER CHILD, WAS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS’ FEES FOR THE REVERSAL OF THE DENIAL 2ND DEPT.
PLAINTIFF BANK DID NOT SEND THE 90-DAY FORECLOSURE NOTICE IN A SEPARATE ENVELOPE AS REQUIRED BY RPAPL 1304; THEREFORE THE BANK’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED AND DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). ​
HERE THE OWNER AND GENERAL CONTRACTOR DEMONSTRATED THEY DID NOT EXERCISE SUPERVISION AND CONTROL OVER THE WORK PLAINTIFF WAS DOING WHEN INJURED; THEREFORE THE LABOR LAW 200 AND COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST THEM SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED; THE COURT NOTED THAT THE RIGHT TO GENERALLY SUPERVISE THE WORK OR TO STOP THE WORK FOR SAFETY VIOLATIONS DOES NOT CONSTITUTE “SUPERVISION AND CONTROL” OF THE WORK WITHIN THE MEANING OF LABOR LAW 200 OR COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE (SECOND DEPT).
DEFENDANT PROPERTY OWNERS DID NOT DEMONSTRATE, AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE DECORATIVE FENCE IN THE GRASSY AREA BETWEEN THE CURB AND THE SIDEWALK WAS OPEN AND OBVIOUS (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO DEMONSTRATE BUS DRIVER SHOULD HAVE SEEN DECEDENT. TRIAL JUDGE’S FAILURE TO WARN DEFENDANT OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF DISRUPTIVE...