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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED BY FANNIE MAE IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION DID NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE BUSINESS RECORDS EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE, FANNIE MAE’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the evidence submitted by the plaintiff (Fannie Mae) in this foreclosure action did not meet the requirements of the business records exception to the hearsay rule and, therefore, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment should not have been granted:

In support of those branches of its motion which were for summary judgment on the complaint insofar as asserted against the defendants and for an order of reference, Fannie Mae submitted affidavits of foreclosure specialists employed by Seterus, Inc., its loan servicer. The foreclosure specialists attested that they were personally familiar with the record-keeping practices and procedures of Seterus, Inc., but failed to lay a proper foundation for the admission of records concerning the defendants’ payment history and default. Accordingly, Fannie Mae failed to demonstrate that the records relied upon in the affidavits were admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule (see CPLR 4518[a] … ). Since Fannie Mae’s motion was based on evidence that was not in admissible form … , Fannie Mae failed to establish its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, and those branches of its motion which were for summary judgment on the complaint insofar as asserted against the defendants and for an order of reference should have been denied, regardless of the sufficiency of the defendants’ papers in opposition … . Federal Natl. Mtge. Assn. v Marlin, 2019 NY Slip Op 00095, Second Dept 1-9-19

 

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