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QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER WHEEL STOP IN PARKING LOT WAS AN OPEN AND OBVIOUS CONDITION.

The Second Department determined a question of fact had been raised whether a wheel stop in a parking area was an open and obvious condition. A photograph demonstrated the wheel stop was partially obstructing a walkway:

Here, the defendants submitted the expert affidavit of a forensic engineer who determined that “the parking lot was a safe walking surface and adequately illuminated at night,” and that the wheel stop on which the injured plaintiff tripped “was an open and obvious condition” located “within a designated parking space” and not a pedestrian walkway. However, the photographs upon which the defendants’ expert partially relies depict the wheel stop as extending directly in front of, and thus partially obstructing, a designated pedestrian walkway. Thus, the defendants failed to satisfy their initial burden of showing that they neither created the hazardous condition nor had actual or constructive notice of its existence for a sufficient length of time to discover and remedy it … . Rivera v Queens Ballpark Co., LLC, 2015 NY Slip Op 09087, 2nd Dept 12-9-15

MONTHLY COMPILATION INEX ENTRIES FOR THIS CASE:

NEGLIGENCE (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER WHEEL STOP WAS OPEN AND OBVIOUS)/SLIP AND FALL (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER WHEEL STOP WAS OPEN AND OBVIOUS)/OPEN AND OBVIOUS CONDITION (WHEEL STOP NOT OPEN AND OBVIOUS AS A MATTER OF LAW)/WHEEL STOP (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER WHEEL STOP WAS OPEN AND OBVIOUS)

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