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CONVERSION THEORY DOES NOT APPLY TO REAL ESTATE OR INTANGIBLE PROPERTY.

The Second Department determined the causes of action for conversion should have been dismissed. Conversion applies only to personal property, not, as here, to real property and a business interest:

 

“A conversion takes place when someone, intentionally and without authority, assumes or exercises control over personal property belonging to someone else, interfering with that person’s right of possession” … . The subject matter of a conversion cause of action ” must constitute identifiable tangible personal property’; real property and interests in business opportunities will not suffice”… . Here, the first cause of action seeks to recover damages for conversion based upon [defendant’s] alleged interference with the right of the plaintiff C & B Enterprises, USA, LLC … , “to possession of its Property,” and the second cause of action seeks to recover damages for conversion based upon [defendant’s] alleged interference “with [the plaintiff[‘s]] right to possession of his ownership of C & B.” Inasmuch as the subjects of these causes of action are real property and [plaintiff’s] interest in a business, respectively, a cause of action in conversion does not lie … . C & B Enters. USA, LLC v Koegel, 2016 NY Slip Op 01281, 2nd Dept 2-24-16

 

CONVERSION (ACTION WILL NOT LIE RE INTANGIBLE PROPERTY OR REAL ESTATE)

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