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BANKRUPTCY TRUSTEE PROPERLY SUBSTITUTED FOR PLAINTIFF IN A PERSONAL INJURY ACTION, DESPITE PLAINTIFF’S FAILURE TO LIST THE ACTION AS AN ASSET IN HIS VOLUNTARY PETITION FOR CHAPTER 7 BANKRUPTCY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the bankruptcy trustee was properly substituted, by the Bankruptcy Court, for plaintiff in a personal injury action, despite the fact that the action had not been listed as an asset when plaintiff filed a voluntary petition for chapter 7 bankruptcy:

The rule that a substitution cannot be made is grounded in Reynolds v Blue Cross of Northeastern N.Y., Inc. (210 AD2d 619). In that case, the plaintiffs commenced an action against the defendants to recover damages for personal injuries. Thereafter, the plaintiffs filed a voluntary petition for chapter 7 bankruptcy, and failed to list the action on the schedule of assets. After the plaintiffs were discharged from bankruptcy, the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, alleging that the plaintiff lacked the capacity to sue. During the pendency of the motion, the plaintiffs moved in the Bankruptcy Court to reopen the bankruptcy proceeding and to have a successor trustee appointed. A successor trustee was appointed, and both the plaintiffs and the interim trustee opposed the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The Appellate Division, 3rd Department, determined that substitution was not available to cure the deficiency, on the ground that a party with no capacity to sue could not be replaced with one who had the capacity to sue, citing Matter of C & M Plastics (Collins) (168 AD2d 160, 161-162). However, in Matter of C & M Plastics (Collins), the proceeding in the Supreme Court was commenced after a bankruptcy petition was filed; therefore, in that case, the plaintiff did not have capacity to sue at the time of the commencement of the action.

Although subsequent cases have held that a substitution of the bankruptcy trustee for the plaintiff cannot be made, even if the plaintiff had the capacity to sue at the time the action or proceedings was commenced (see Rivera v Markowitz, 71 AD3d 449, 450; Pinto v Ancona, 262 AD2d 472), other cases have held that where a motion for substitution was made at the direction of a bankruptcy court, the motion should be granted, as a matter of comity (see Berry v Rampersad, 21 Misc 3d 851 [Sup Ct, Kings County]). … As a matter of comity, and in deference to the determination of the Bankruptcy Court, we agree with the Supreme Court’s determination to grant the plaintiff’s cross motion, inter alia, to substitute the bankruptcy trustee as the plaintiff, and to deny the defendants’ motion for leave to amend their answer to assert the affirmative defense of lack of capacity to sue, and thereupon, to dismiss the complaint. Fausset v Turner Constr. Co., 2019 NY Slip Op 08173, Second Dept 11-13-19

 

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