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Review Criteria for Municipal Disability Hearing Explained

The Second Department, in an Article 78 proceeding, explained the review criteria where there has been a disability hearing (re: a firefighter) held by a municipality pursuant to General Municipal Law 207-a:

Judicial review of an administrative determination made after a hearing required by law at which evidence is taken is limited to whether the determination is supported by substantial evidence (see CPLR 7803[4]…). Substantial evidence means more than a “mere scintilla of evidence,” and the test of whether substantial evidence exists in a record is one of rationality, taking into account all the evidence on both sides … .

When there is conflicting evidence or different inferences may be drawn, “the duty of weighing the evidence and making the choice rests solely upon the [administrative agency]. The courts may not weigh the evidence or reject the choice made by [such agency] where the evidence is conflicting and room for choice exists”… .. Moreover, where there is conflicting expert testimony, in making a General Municipal Law § 207-a determination, a municipality is “free to credit one physician’s testimony over that of another” … . Thus, even if “conflicting medical evidence can be found in the record,” the municipality’s determination, based on its own expert’s conclusions, may still be supported by substantial evidence… . Matter of Solano v City of Mount Vernon, 2013 NY Slip Op 05322, 2nd Dept 7-17-13

 

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