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JUSTICES DISAGREE WHETHER STOLEN PROPERTY AND ASSAULT AND ROBBERY OFFENSES SHOULD HAVE BEEN SEVERED AS NOT SIMILAR IN LAW.

In affirming defendant’s conviction, the First Department, in two concurring memoranda, disagreed about whether the offenses should have been severed. Defendant assaulted and robbed a subway passenger, and upon arrest several stolen MetroCards were seized. Defendant was tried on all offenses in a single trial. Justice Renwick, disagreeing with Justice Andrias, argued that the severance issue was preserved and the motion should have been granted (although the error was harmless):

 

[FROM JUSTICE RENWICK’S CONCURRING MEMORANDUM:] Under the principles set forth in People v Pierce (14 NY3d 564, 573-574 [2010]), the motion court should have granted defendant’s motion to sever the counts charging possession of stolen property, relating to eight stolen MetroCards, from the other counts of the indictment, relating to an assault and robbery. The counts were not properly joined under CPL 200.20(2)(c), because they were not “similar in law,” except to the extent that “both offenses involve misappropriated property,” which does not suffice (id. at 574). Although the counts at issue here are more closely connected, factually, than were the counts in Pierce, we reject the People’s argument that this difference warrants a different result under the statute. While factual or evidentiary connections between counts may be relevant to joinder and severance under other portions of CPL 200.20 that are not applicable here, CPL 200.20(2)(c) only involves similarity of statutory provisions defining offenses. People v Davis, 2016 NY Slip Op 01257, 1st Dept 2-23-16

 

CRIMINAL LAW (JUSTICES DISAGREE WHETHER STOLEN PROPERTY AND ASSAULT AND ROBBERY OFFENSES SHOULD HAVE BEEN SEVERED)/SEVERANCE OF COUNTS (CRIMINAL LAW, JUSTICES DISAGREE WHETHER STOLEN PROPERTY AND ASSAULT AND ROBBERY OFFENSES SHOULD HAVE BEEN SEVERED)

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