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DEFENDANT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ARRAIGNED ON A SPECIAL INFORMATION CONCERNING A PRIOR CONVICTION PRIOR TO JURY SELECTION, THE STATUTE REQUIRES ARRAIGNMENT AFTER JURY SELECTION, THE ERROR WAS DEEMED HARMLESS HOWEVER (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, over a dissent, determined defendant should not have been arraigned on a special information pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law 200,60 before jury selection. The procedure avoids the presentation of proof of a prior conviction at trial. The error was deemed harmless by the majority. The dissent argued the error was not harmless and would have ordered a new trial:

A court cannot disregard plain statutory language simply because it concludes that an alternate procedure would be consonant with the policy underlying the statute. Courts do not possess the power to ignore the legislature … . It may well be that the legislature’s general purpose in enacting CPL 200.60 was to avoid the prejudicial effect of having the prior offense proven before the jury. However, such a purpose does not support reading the timing requirement out of the statute. Allowing a defendant to wait until after the commencement of the trial ensures that he will have as much information as possible when forced to make the choice of admitting his prior conviction and relieving the People of its burden to prove it beyond a reasonable doubt; or denying the conviction and allowing the jury to learn about it. …

Despite the court’s error, however, we are obliged to affirm because defendant has not shown any prejudice arising from the fact that he was required to decide whether to contest the prior conviction earlier than necessary. Defendant does not assert that he would have contested the conviction if he had been asked after jury selection. Thus, defendant’s claims of prejudice are speculative. People v Alston, 2019 NY Slip Op 00410, First Dept 1-22-19

 

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