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COUNTY CHARTER CONTROLLED WHERE THERE WAS A CONFLICT BETWEEN THE CHARTER AND AN ADMINISTRATIVE CODE PROVISION RE: ARBITRATION OF POLICE DISCIPLINARY MATTERS.

The Second Department determined the county did not have the authority to enter into an agreement with the police union (PBA) to arbitrate certain police disciplinary matters. The county charter vested the power to discipline police in the police commissioner. The charter provision was deemed controlling. Therefore the administrative code provision allowing the binding arbitration of disciplinary matters was properly repealed by a local law subsequently enacted by the county:

… [S]ince the County Charter vested the power to discipline members of the Nassau County Police Department exclusively with the Commissioner of Police, the County Legislature’s attempt to divest the Commissioner of a portion of that disciplinary authority by amending the County Administrative Code to allow for binding arbitration of certain disciplinary matters created a conflict between the code and the charter, and, in the face of such a conflict, the charter controlled … . Therefore, the court properly concluded that the County Legislature’s enactment of section 8-13.0(e) of the Nassau County Administrative Code was invalid, and that the subsequent repeal of section 8-13.0(e) of the County Administrative Code by Local Law No. 9-2012 of the County of Nassau was proper and should not be enjoined. Moreover, as the County Legislature expressly committed disciplinary authority over the Nassau County Police Department to the Commissioner of Police, collective bargaining over disciplinary matters was prohibited … . Carver v County of Nassau, 2016 NY Slip Op 00466, 2nd Dept 1-27-16

MUNICIPAL LAW (COUNTY CHARTER TRUMPS ADMINISTRATIVE CODE)/COUNTIES (COUNTY CHARTER TRUMPS ADMINISTRATIVE CODE)/CHARTERS (COUNTY CHARTER TRUMPS ADMINISTRATIVE CODE)/UNIONS (COUNTY CHARTER TRUMPS POLICE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT)/PUBLIC EMPLOYEES (COUNTY CHARTER TRUMPS COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT)/COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS (COUNTY CHARTER TRUMPS POLICE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT)/POLICE (COUNTY CHARTER TRUMPS COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT)

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