You are here: / / DEFENDANT HOSPITAL DISCHARGED A PATIENT WITH A HISTORY OF SCHIZOPHRENIA...
,

DEFENDANT HOSPITAL DISCHARGED A PATIENT WITH A HISTORY OF SCHIZOPHRENIA BUT NO HISTORY OF THREATENING OR ASSAULTING PEOPLE; THE PATIENT ASSAULTED PLAINTIFF, THE CAB DRIVER PAID BY THE HOSPITAL TO TAKE THE PATIENT HOME; THE HOSPITAL DID NOT OWE A DUTY OF CARE TO PLAINTIFF (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant hospital did not owe a duty of care to the cab driver injured (assaulted) by a patient (Barrio) who was just released, despite the fact that the cab fare was paid by the hospital:

… [T]he defendant Francis Barrios was taken by ambulance to the emergency department of the defendant John T. Mather Memorial Hospital (hereinafter the hospital). Barrios, who had a history of schizophrenia, complained of anxiety, tremors, and blurry vision. The hospital records indicated that Barrios did not have a history of threatening or attempting to hurt others, or of actually hurting others, and that Barrios did not display any signs of violent behavior. After consultation with the psychiatrist on call, it was determined that Barrios should be discharged and should seek outpatient treatment. * * *

“The elements of a cause of action alleging common-law negligence are a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, a breach of that duty, and a showing that the breach was a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury” … . “Without a duty running directly to the injured person, there can be no liability” … . “Generally, a defendant has no duty to control the conduct of third persons so as to prevent them from harming others” … . “A duty may arise, however, where there is a relationship either between defendant and a third-person tortfeasor that encompasses defendant’s actual control of the third person’s actions, or between defendant and plaintiff that requires defendant to protect plaintiff from the conduct of others” … .

Here, the plaintiffs failed to establish, prima facie, that the hospital owed the injured plaintiff a duty. There is no evidence that the hospital had sufficient authority and ability to control Barrios’s actions after he was discharged and left the hospital … . The hospital’s decision to pay for a taxi service for Barrios after his discharge did not make the hospital the injured plaintiff’s employer, make the hospital an agent for Barrios, or otherwise create a special duty … . Further, absent evidence in the record that the hospital knew or should have known that Barrios posed a threat to the injured plaintiff, she was a member of the general public and not of a class of people to whom the hospital owed a duty … . Melio v John T. Mather Mem. Hosp., 2025 NY Slip Op 03562, Second Dept 6-11-25

Practice Point: Here a discharged patient with schizophrenia assaulted the cab driver paid by the hospital to take the patent home. The hospital did not owe a duty of care to the cab driver.

 

You might also like
HOSPITAL DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE TREATING EMERGENCY PHYSICIAN WAS NOT AN EMPLOYEE AND DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE EMERGENCY PHYSICIAN DID NOT DEPART FROM ACCEPTED STANDARDS OF MEDICAL CARE; THE HOSPITAL’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
APPEAL DISMISSED BECAUSE DEFENDANT WAS DEPORTED (SECOND DEPT).
A PROPER FOUNDATION FOR THE BUSINESS RECORDS NECESSARY TO DEMONSTRATE STANDING TO BRING THE FORECLOSURE ACTION WAS NOT LAID; THE BANK’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
Bank’s Duty With Respect to Negligent Dishonoring of a Cashier’s Check 
PLAINTIFF WAS NOT ENGAGED IN CONSTRUCTION WORK OR IN A CONSTRUCTION AREA WHEN HE WAS INJURED, HE WAS BRINGING IN SUPPLIES WHICH WERE BEING STOCKPILED AND WERE NOT FOR IMMEDIATE USE, THEREFORE THE LABOR LAW 240 (1) AND 241 (6) CAUSES OF ACTION WERE PROPERLY DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).
MOTION TO RENEW PROPERLY USED TO CORRECT DEFECT IN INITIAL PAPERS (DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPTS UNSIGNED), PLAINTIFF RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT BAR SERVED DRIVER WHEN HE WAS VISIBLY INTOXICATED (DRAM SHOP ACT).
PLAINTIFF’S ACTION ALLEGING INADEQUATE BUILDING SECURITY WAS A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF AN ASSAULT ON PLAINTIFF IN THE BUILDING LOBBY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED; THERE WAS EVIDENCE OF PRIOR CRIMINAL ACTIVITY RAISING A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE ASSAULT WAS FORESEEABLE (SECOND DEPT).
ALTHOUGH THE JUDGMENTS WERE DOCKETED, THE DEBTOR’S NAME WAS MISSPELLED RENDERING THE LIEN INVALID; ALTHOUGH THE ISSUE WAS NOT RAISED BELOW, THE APPELLATE COURT CAN CONSIDER AN ISSUE OF LAW WHICH COULD NOT BE AVOIDED IF IT HAD BEEN RAISED (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT WAS KILLED WHEN THROWN FROM A RENTED MOPED; THE RENTAL... HERE THE FIRST “NAIL AND MAIL” AFFIDAVIT BY THE PROCESS SERVER FAILED...