The Third Department affirmed Supreme Court’s annulment of the Board of Parole’s denial of petitioner’s request for release on parole. Petitioner’s record in prison was exceptional except for a four-month period during which his medication to treat schizophrenia was stopped. Once medication resumed, petitioner once again functioned well:
The Board is charged with considering whether “there is a reasonable probability that, if [an] inmate is released, he [or she] will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his [or her] release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness of his [or her] crime as to undermine respect for the law” (Executive Law § 259-i [2] [c] [A]). “The decision to grant parole release is discretionary, but the Board is required to consider certain guidelines in making its determination” … . These guidelines include such factors as the inmate’s institutional record, his or her release plans, the seriousness of the offense, and his or her prior criminal record (see Executive Law § 259-i [2] [c] [A] [i], [iii], [vii], [viii]; 9 NYCRR 8002.3 [a] [1], [3], [7], [8]). In 2011, the law was amended to further require that the Board’s “review must include an instrument that measures rehabilitation and the likelihood of success on parole” (… see Executive Law §§ 259-c [4]; 259-i [2] [c]). The Board utilizes the COMPAS assessment to satisfy this requirement … . * * *
Considering this factual background, we agree with Supreme Court that the Board’s determination was irrational … . Further, it was irrational to such a degree that it cannot withstand judicial scrutiny, despite the very limited scope of our review (see Executive Law § 259-i [5]…). As petitioner argues, a fair review of this record compels the conclusion that the determination to remove him from all medication for his mental illness led to a psychotic breakdown that rendered him unable to comply with prison regulations during the period when the disciplinary infractions occurred. To withhold petitioner’s necessary medications was apparently an error of medical judgment. However, for the Board to then rely upon petitioner’s conduct during the psychotic crisis that was thus precipitated as a primary ground for denying his release is so inherently unfair and unreasonable that it meets the high standard of “irrationality bordering on impropriety” warranting our intervention … . To hold otherwise would, in effect, result in punishing petitioner with continued incarceration for the failure of prison officials to provide him with proper treatment for his mental illness — a result that we cannot sanction. Accordingly, we agree with Supreme Court that petitioner must be afforded a de novo hearing before the Board. Matter of Hawthorne v Stanford, 2016 NY Slip Op 00083, 3rd Dept 1-7-16
CRIMINAL LAW (DENIAL OF PAROLE BASED ON BEHAVIOR WHEN PETITIONER WAS DENIED MEDICATION FOR SCHIZOPHRENIA WAS IRRATIONAL)/PAROLE (DENIAL OF PAROLE BASED ON BEHAVIOR WHEN PETITIONER WAS DENIED MEDICATION FOR SCHIZOPHRENIA WAS IRRATIONAL)/MENTAL ILLNESS (DENIAL OF PAROLE BASED ON BEHAVIOR WHEN PETITIONER WAS DENIED MEDICATION FOR SCHIZOPHRENIA WAS IRRATIONAL)