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THE STATEMENTS MADE ABOUT PLAINTIFF WERE PROTECTED BY QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE; PLAINTIFF WAS UNABLE TO SHOW THE STATEMENTS WERE MOTIVATED SOLELY BY MALICE; THE DEFAMATION ACTION WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department determined plaintiff’s defamation action was properly dismissed. Plaintiff was accused by a fellow library board member, Hoag, of misappropriating over $20,000 in library funds. A criminal investigation uncovered no wrongdoing and plaintiff brought the defamation suit. The defamatory statements were protected by a qualified privilege because Hoag had an interest in the subject matter and the statements were made to a person with a corresponding interest. Therefore the statements were actionable only if Hoag was motivated solely by malice. The court held the statements were made in good faith, despite evidence that Hoag disliked plaintiff:

“Courts have long recognized that the public interest is served by shielding certain communications, though possibly defamatory, from litigation, rather than risk stifling them altogether” … . Those communications include ones protected by the qualified privilege that attaches to a person’s good faith communication “upon a subject in which he or she has an interest, or a legal, moral or societal interest to speak, and . . . made to a person with a corresponding interest” … . …

Defendants … came forward with proof that Hoag made the communication in good faith, with Hoag and other Board members averring that their review of financial records, as well as plaintiff’s refusal to provide requested documentation, caused them to believe that plaintiff had made numerous questionable, unauthorized and/or undocumented expenditures of library funds. …

Inasmuch as the proof reflects that the inquiry into library spending by Hoag and other Board members was at least part of what led Hoag to accuse plaintiff of misappropriating funds, “even if [Hoag] disliked plaintiff or possessed some ill will towards her, plaintiff has failed to make an evidentiary showing that [Hoag was] motivated by malice alone in making the statement[]” … . Macumber v South New Berlin Lib., 2020 NY Slip Op 05113, Third Dept 9-24-20

 

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