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Two-Justice Dissent Argued Termination of Father’s Parental Rights Was Not In the Best Interests of the Child

The Second Department, over a two-justice dissent, determined father had abandoned the child and his parental rights were properly terminated. The dissent argued that, because of new facts revealed after the order appealed from was issued, and because the mother’s parental rights were not terminated, severing the child from his father was not in the child’s best interests:

FROM THE DISSENT

A petition to terminate parental rights on the ground of abandonment may be denied where, despite evidence that the parent abandoned the child during the six-month period prior to the filing of the petition, the record nevertheless demonstrates that termination would not be in the best interests of the child … . Here, my colleagues in the majority conclude that the father’s failure to take prompt action to assert paternity after the mother informed him that he might be the child’s father in the six months prior to the filing of the petition constituted abandonment. However, that finding does not mandate granting the petition to terminate parental rights where, as here, new facts arose after the filing of the petition, and after the issuance of the order appealed from, which demonstrate that termination of the father’s parental rights is not in the child’s best interests … . * * *

.[T]here are no facts in this record which indicate that a relationship between the child and his father will be harmful to the child … . * * * It appears from this record that terminating the father’s parental rights would serve no purpose other than to sever any potential ties between the child and his father and paternal kindred. Matter of Jake W.E. (Jonathan S.), 2015 NY Slip Op 07840, 2nd Dept 10-28-15

 

 

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