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NO ONE AT THE DEFENDANT HEALTH CLUB WHEN PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT SUFFERED A HEART ATTACK WAS CERTIFIED TO PROVIDE EMERGENCY AID AND THE EMPLOYEE DELAYED CALLING 911; PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment against defendant health club for failing to aid plaintiff’s decedent when she had a heart attack at the club. The only club employee on duty, Higgins, was not certified to provide emergency aid and delayed calling 911:

The Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the plaintiff’s motion which was for summary judgment on the issue of liability on the common-law negligence cause of action to the extent of granting partial summary judgment on the issue of the defendants’ breach of their limited duty of care to render aid to patrons struck down by heart attack or cardiac arrest. In Miglino v Bally Total Fitness of Greater N.Y., Inc. (20 NY3d 342), the Court of Appeals recognized that “New York courts have viewed health clubs as owing a limited duty of care to patrons struck down by a heart attack or cardiac arrest while engaged in athletic activities on premises” (id. at 350). The Court of Appeals has referred to this limited duty as the health club’s “common-law duty to render aid” (id. at 351 …). A health club fulfills this duty by, for example, calling 911 immediately, responding to the patron and performing CPR or other measures, or responding to the patron and then deferring to someone else with superior medical training … . Hamlin v PFNY, LLC, 2020 NY Slip Op 00574. Second Dept 1-29-20

 

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