You are here: / / Trial Court Has the Discretion to Determine the Best Venue for Consolidated...

Trial Court Has the Discretion to Determine the Best Venue for Consolidated Actions—Here a County Other than the County Where the First Action Was Brought Was Properly Determined to Be the Most Appropriate Venue

In a medical malpractice case, the Second Department determined Supreme Court properly exercised its discretion re: the venue of these consolidated actions.  Although the venue of the initial action (Queens County) should usually serve as the venue of the consolidated actions, here the medical treatment was rendered at a hospital in Nassau County, many individual defendants resided in Nassau County, and the plaintiffs themselves resided in Nassau County at the time each action was commenced—making Nassau County the best venue for the proceedings:

“When a trial court orders consolidation or joint trials under CPLR 602(a), venue should generally be placed in the county where jurisdiction was invoked in the first action” … . However, where special circumstances are present, the court, in its discretion, may place venue elsewhere … .

Here, the claims relate to treatment rendered at St. Francis Hospital, located in Nassau County. Many of the individual defendants resided in Nassau County. All of the individual defendants worked in Nassau County at the time of the alleged malpractice and lack of informed consent. The plaintiffs themselves resided in Nassau County at the time each action was commenced. Under these circumstances, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting those branches of the cross motions which were to place the venue of the consolidated action in Nassau County and denying that branch of the plaintiffs’ motion which was to place venue in Queens County… . Castro v Durban, 2015 NY Slip Op 04600, 2nd Dept 6-3-15

 

You might also like
EXPERT AFFIDAVIT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE, PRIMA FACIE, THAT DEFENDANT DOCTORS DID NOT DEPART FROM GOOD AND ACCEPTED PRACTICE, DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
ALTHOUGH THE PLANNING BOARD HELD THAT IT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE PROPOSED DEVELOPMENT, A FINDING WITH WHICH PETITIONERS DISAGREED, THE BOARD ALSO HELD THE PETITIONERS COULD APPLY FOR A HARDSHIP EXEMPTION WHICH WAS NOT DONE, THE ACTION IS THEREFORE PREMATURE (SECOND DEPT).
RECOVERY FROM THE MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT INDEMNIFICATION CORPORATION FOR INJURY BY AN UNKNOWN DRIVER DEPENDS ON WHETHER THE INJURY IS THE RESULT OF AN ACCIDENT OR INTENTIONAL CONDUCT, NO RECOVERY FOR INJURY RESULTING FROM INTENTIONAL CONDUCT (SECOND DEPT).
DUCT TAPE USED TO SILENCE AND RESTRAIN THE VICTIM WAS A DANGEROUS INSTRUMENT WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ROBBERY FIRST STATUTE, KIDNAPPING BASED UPON THE RESTRAINT OF THE VICTIM DID NOT MERGE WITH ROBBERY, DISSENT DISAGREED (SECOND DEPT).
THE VAGUE IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE RENDERED THE CONVICTION AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE (SECOND DEPT).
Question of Fact Whether Employer Considered Accommodation for Plaintiff’s Injury—Summary Judgment to Employer Should Not Have Been Granted
DEFENDANT GRANDFATHER DID NOT HAVE A DUTY TO CONTROL HIS COLLEGE-AGE GRANDSON IN THIS ROAD RAGE INCIDENT, THEREFORE THE NEGLIGENCE ACTION WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED, HOWEVER THE AIDING-AND-ABETTING ASSAULT CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT GRANDFATHER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).
NO ONE, INCLUDING DEFENDANT DRIVER, SAW THE 17-MONTH-OLD BEFORE HEARING A LOUD “THUMP” AND FINDING THE CHILD LYING BEHIND DEFENDANT’S CAR; DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

Plaintiffs Should Have Been Allowed to Amend the Pleadings to Conform to the... Defendant’s Submissions Did Not Rebut the Presumption of Receipt of the...