You are here: / / Injury While Trying to Pick Up a Fallen 3000 Pound Roll of Paper Was a...
,

Injury While Trying to Pick Up a Fallen 3000 Pound Roll of Paper Was a Foreseeable Consequence of an Alleged Equipment Defect Which Caused the Roll to Fall

The Fourth Department determined the summary judgment motion of the defendants—manufacturers and modifiers of a pallet truck—was properly denied.  The complaint alleged the pallet truck and the roll cradle with which the pallet truck was modified were defective, causing a 3000 pound roll of paper to fall off the truck.  Plaintiff was severely injured while trying to lift the fallen roll.  The defendants’ arguments that any defects in the pallet truck and roll cradle were not the proximate cause of the injury, and the attempt to pick up the fallen roll was the superseding cause of the injuries, were rejected. The court determined the cause of the injury was within the class of foreseeable hazards associated with a fallen roll and the risk of the intervening act (lifting the fallen roll) was the same risk that renders the actor negligent:

“As a general rule, the question of proximate cause is to be decided by the finder of fact, aided by appropriate instructions” … . Where the cause of an accident is “within the class of foreseeable hazards that [a] duty exists to prevent, the [defendant] may be held liable, even though the harm may have been brought about in an unexpected way” … . We conclude that the hazard that caused plaintiff’s injury, i.e., the movement of the roll while it was being placed back in an upright position, was “within the class of foreseeable hazards” associated with a roll falling off the allegedly defective pallet truck …, and thus a jury “could rationally [find] that . . . there was a causal connection between [defendants’ alleged] negligence and plaintiff’s injuries” … . We thus reject the contention of defendants that the falling roll merely “furnished the occasion” for plaintiff’s accident.

We also reject the contention of defendants that the actions of plaintiff and his coworkers in attempting to upright the roll were a superseding cause of plaintiff’s injuries. “An intervening act may not serve as a superseding cause, and relieve an actor of responsibility, where the risk of the intervening act is the very same risk which renders the actor negligent” … . As noted above, the risk of the roll falling while being uprighted is the same risk underlying plaintiffs’ allegations of negligence, and we conclude that the actions of plaintiff and his coworkers were not “of such an extraordinary nature” as to relieve defendants of liability … . Ard v Thompson & Johnson Equip. Co., Inc., 2015 NY Slip Op 03985, 4th Dept 5-8-15

 

You might also like
AGENT FOR US CUSTOMS WAS NOT ACTING AS A PEACE OFFICER WHEN HE EFFECTED A VEHICLE STOP AND DID NOT EFFECT A VALID CITIZEN’S ARREST, THEREFORE THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE FIREARM FOUND IN THE VEHICLE WAS PROPERLY GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT).
PLAINTIFFS ALLEGED THE CONTRACT FOR THE PURCHASE OF LAND INCLUDED A PARCEL OF LAND NOT INCLUDED IN THE DEED AND SOUGHT A CORRECTED DEED; PURSUANT TO THE MERGER DOCTRINE, THE CONTRACT AND THE DEED MERGED AT THE CLOSING AND THE PROPERTY DESCRIPTION IN THE DEED IS DEEMED TO REFLECT THE FINAL AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES (ABSENT FRAUD OR AMBIGUITY IN THE DEED); PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FOURTH DEPT).
Failure of Sentencing Court to Inform Defendant of Period of Post-Release Supervision Required Release after Sentence Served
WILL THAT CANNOT BE FOUND IS PRESUMED REVOKED, HERE PETITIONER DID NOT REBUT THE PRESUMPTION OF REVOCATION, CRITERIA EXPLAINED (FOURTH DEPT).
A STACK OF DRYWALL LEANING AGAINST A WALL AND PARTIALLY BLOCKING A DOORWAY FELL OVER ON PLAINTIFF’S ANKLE AS PLAINTIFF ATTEMPTED TO MOVE IT; THE LABOR LAW 240(1) AND 241(6) CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FOURTH DEPT). ​
DEFENDANT, AN OUT OF POSSESSION LESSEE OF THE PROPERTY WHERE PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED, WAS NOT AN OWNER WITHIN THE MEANING OF LABOR LAW 240 (1) AND 241 (6), DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT DISMISSING THOSE CAUSES OF ACTION WAS PROPERLY GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT).
DEFENDANT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN REQUIRED TO PROCEED PRO SE ON THE PEOPLE’S MOTION TO COMPEL A BUCCAL SWAB FOR DNA TESTING (FOURTH DEPT).
THE LABOR LAW 240(1), 241(6) AND 200 CAUSES OF ACTION WERE PROPERLY DISMISSED BECAUSE PLAINTIFF WAS NOT INVOLVED IN THE RELEVANT WORK, HOWEVER THE COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED BECAUSE IT WAS BASED ON THE CREATION AND NOTICE OF A DANGEROUS CONDITION (FOURTH DEPT). ​

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2025 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

Late Notice of Claim Can Be Allowed Even in Absence of Reasonable Excuse Where... Rule Requiring Submission of Order or Judgment for Signature within 60 Days...