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You are here: Home1 / Criminal Law2 / DEFENDANT’S PRE-MIRANDA STATEMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED, DEFENDANT...
Criminal Law, Evidence

DEFENDANT’S PRE-MIRANDA STATEMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED, DEFENDANT DEMONSTRATED HE WAS NOT COMPETENT TO TESTIFY AT THE GRAND JURY, HIS GRAND JURY TESTIMONY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED IN EVIDENCE (FOURTH DEPT). ​

The Fourth Department, reversing defendant’s conviction and ordering a new trial, determined the portion of defendant’s videotaped statement that was allowed in evidence should have been suppressed, and the jury should not have heard defendant’s grand jury testimony because he was not competent to testify at the time:

… [T]he court erred in suppressing only a portion of his videotaped statement to police investigators inasmuch as the portion of the statement that the court refused to suppress was also obtained prior to the administration of Miranda warnings. Although the court properly determined that defendant was in custody from the outset of the interview, we conclude that the court erred in determining that Miranda warnings were not required before defendant admitted to having a foot fetish inasmuch as “the facts indicated that an interrogational environment existed” from the outset of the interview … . …

Although a defendant is presumed to be competent to testify before the grand jury … , here, we conclude that defendant rebutted that presumption. Indeed, defendant’s grand jury testimony, a rambling, delusional and bizarre narrative of government conspiracy, prompted one grand juror to inquire of defendant whether he had any psychiatric diagnoses. Within days of his testimony at the grand jury, the arraigning court referred defendant for a CPL article 730 psychiatric examination based upon what the court described as “confused, or bizarre behavior” and the inability “to understand charges or court processes.” Shortly thereafter, two psychiatric examiners found that defendant lacked capacity to understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his defense based upon a diagnosis of Delusional Disorder, Paranoid Type. As a result, defendant was involuntarily committed to a psychiatric facility under the auspices of the Office of Mental Health. We thus conclude that defendant rebutted the presumption of competence, and that the court abused its discretion in denying the motion to preclude the grand jury testimony … . People v Perri, 2018 NY Slip Op 04134, Fourth Dept 6-8-18

CRIMINAL LAW (DEFENDANT’S PRE-MIRANDA STATEMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED, DEFENDANT DEMONSTRATED HE WAS NOT COMPETENT TO TESTIFY AT THE GRAND JURY, HIS GRAND JURY TESTIMONY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED IN EVIDENCE (FOURTH DEPT))/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, DEFENDANT’S PRE-MIRANDA STATEMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED, DEFENDANT DEMONSTRATED HE WAS NOT COMPETENT TO TESTIFY AT THE GRAND JURY, HIS GRAND JURY TESTIMONY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED IN EVIDENCE (FOURTH DEPT))/SUPPRESS, MOTION TO  (DEFENDANT’S PRE-MIRANDA STATEMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED, DEFENDANT DEMONSTRATED HE WAS NOT COMPETENT TO TESTIFY AT THE GRAND JURY, HIS GRAND JURY TESTIMONY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED IN EVIDENCE (FOURTH DEPT))/STATEMENTS (CRIMINAL LAW, PRE-MIRANDA, DEFENDANT’S PRE-MIRANDA STATEMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED, DEFENDANT DEMONSTRATED HE WAS NOT COMPETENT TO TESTIFY AT THE GRAND JURY, HIS GRAND JURY TESTIMONY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED IN EVIDENCE (FOURTH DEPT))/MIRANDA (CRIMINAL LAW, PRE-MIRANDA, DEFENDANT’S PRE-MIRANDA STATEMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED, DEFENDANT DEMONSTRATED HE WAS NOT COMPETENT TO TESTIFY AT THE GRAND JURY, HIS GRAND JURY TESTIMONY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED IN EVIDENCE (FOURTH DEPT))/GRAND JURY (DEFENDANT DEMONSTRATED HE WAS NOT COMPETENT TO TESTIFY AT THE GRAND JURY, HIS GRAND JURY TESTIMONY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED IN EVIDENCE (FOURTH DEPT))/COMPETENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, GRAND JURY TESTIMONY, DEFENDANT DEMONSTRATED HE WAS NOT COMPETENT TO TESTIFY AT THE GRAND JURY, HIS GRAND JURY TESTIMONY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED IN EVIDENCE (FOURTH DEPT))

June 8, 2018
Tags: Fourth Department
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