You are here: / / Rule Requiring Submission of Order or Judgment for Signature within 60...
,

Rule Requiring Submission of Order or Judgment for Signature within 60 Days Applies Only When Court Directs that the Proposed Order Be Settled or Submitted for Signature

The Fourth Department determined an action had not been abandoned for failure to submit the order for signature within 60 days pursuant to 22 NYCRR 202.48.  That rule applies only when the court directs a party to submit or settle an order or judgment:

…[W]e agree with plaintiff that the court erred in dismissing the complaint sua sponte pursuant to 22 NYCRR 202.48. That rule provides that “[p]roposed orders or judgments . . . must be submitted for signature, unless otherwise directed by the court, within 60 days after the signing and filing of the decision directing that the order be settled or submitted . . . Failure to submit the order or judgment timely shall be deemed an abandonment of the motion or action, unless for good cause shown” (22 NYCRR 202.48 [a], [b]). As the Court of Appeals wrote, “[b]y its plain terms, section 202.48 (a) speaks to the circumstances where the court’s decision expressly directs a party to submit or settle an order or judgment” (Funk v Barry, 89 NY2d 364, 367). Thus, the Court held that “the 60-day period applies only where the court explicitly directs that the proposed judgment or order be settled or submitted for signature” (id. at 365). Here, the order of reference did not explicitly direct plaintiff to settle or submit an order or judgment for signature. Rather, it directed plaintiff to submit a “Motion or [an] Ex Parte Application” seeking a judgment of foreclosure and sale. We therefore conclude that the court erred in dismissing the complaint in reliance on 22 NYCRR 202.48… . Midfirst Bank v Bellinger, 2014 NY Slip Op 03365, 4th Dept 5-9-14

 

You might also like
Failure to Turn Over Brady Material Until the Day of Trial Required Reversal
LEGAL SENTENCE FOR A PERSISTENT FELONY OFFENDER DRASTICALLY REDUCED IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE PURSUANT TO A MOTION FOR A WRIT OF CORAM NOBIS BASED UPON APPELLATE COUNSEL’S FAILURE TO CONTEND THE SENTENCING COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION (FOURTH DEPT).
Parole Violation Did Not Preclude Application for Resentencing Under the Drug Law Reform Act
Summary Judgment for Out of Possession Landlord in Slip and Fall Case
ISSUE OF FACT WHETHER DRIVER WITH THE RIGHT OF WAY SHOULD HAVE SEEN THE CAR THAT WAS NOT SLOWING DOWN AS IT APPROACHED THE INTERSECTION, SUPREME COURT REVERSED, TWO-JUSTICE DISSENT (FOURTH DEPT).
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO VACATE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT ON THE GROUND THAT THE ISSUING COURT DID NOT HAVE PERSONAL JURISDICTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED EVEN THOUGH THE JUDGMENT HAD BEEN SATISFIED BY A PROPERTY EXECUTION, IF DEFENDANT CAN DEMONSTRATE A LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION, THE JUDGMENT WILL BE A NULLITY (FOURTH DEPT).
COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO APPLY THE “MADE WHOLE” RULE IN THIS SUBROGATION ACTION.
ALTHOUGH THE MAJORITY AFFIRMED DEFENDANT’S CONVICTION, THE TWO DISSENTERS WOULD HAVE DISMISSED THE INDICTMENT BECAUSE THE TESTIMONY OF THE POLICE OFFICERS AT THE SUPPRESSION HEARING DESCRIBING THE TRAFFIC STOP WAS NOT CREDIBLE (FOURTH DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

Unexplained Collapse of Worker on the Job Properly Presumed to Arise Out of... Insurance Company’s Documents Protected by Attorney-Client Privilege/Where...